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Abstract 
There is a growing body of empirical literature exploring how the priming of religious 
concepts influences prosociality. While many studies have used broad sets of religious primes 
covering a wide range of religious concepts, many recent studies have demonstrated that 
specific categories of religious primes (e.g., forgiveness- and punishment-related) 
differentially influence prosociality. However, only one study (Harrell, 2012) has explored 
the prosocial effects of reward-related religious primes. I conducted three priming studies to 
further test Harrell’s hypothesis that reward-related religious primes can positively influence 
prosociality (i.e., the supernatural reward hypothesis or SRH; see Saleam & Moustafa, 
2016). Studies 1 and 2 explored the effects of generic and culturally-sensitive explicit reward-
related religious primes, respectively, on the generosity of religious participants in the 
Dictator Game. Study 3 explored the effects of implicit reward-related religious primes on the 
generosity of religious participants in a charitable giving task. Neither explicit priming study 
yielded data supportive of the SRH; however, participants exposed to reward-related religious 
primes in Study 3, who expressed awareness of the reward-relevance of the primes, did 
exhibit greater generosity than participants who interpreted those same primes as being 
relevant to divine mercifulness. These participants also gave more generously than 
participants exposed to reward-related secular primes, neutral religious primes, or control 
primes. Collectively, these findings demonstrate the need to distinguish between concepts of 
divine reward and divine forgiveness/mercifulness when testing the SRH. However, given the 
results across these three studies, it is unclear whether reward-related religious concepts do 
effectively promote prosociality. 
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Introduction 
There is a vast body of research exploring links between religiosity and prosociality 
(i.e., the tendency to think and behave in ways that prioritise and promote the well-being of 
others). Numerous studies have found a link between religious belief and 
attitudinal/behavioural prosociality (e.g., Ahmed, 2009; Stavrova & Siegers, 2014). This 
seems unsurprising, given that the religious texts of the main religions of today (e.g., the 
Bible, Qur’an, Mahabharata) all feature moral lessons, injunctions, prescriptions and 
proscriptions (Saleam & Moustafa, 2016). Moreover, many of the moral teachings of these 
religious texts are reinforced with promises of divine rewards for moral behaviour and divine 
punishments for immoral behaviour. This provides religious people with obvious incentives 
for conducting themselves morally, thereby making the religion-prosociality link even more 
explicable. 
Even some secular philosophers have defended religion as a major driving force for 
moral behaviour, and/or have argued that religion may be better positioned than ‘science’ to 
provide a foundation and framework for morality (e.g., Berlinski, 2009; Gould, 1997). 
Prominent voices in the ‘atheist community’ have also acknowledged the apparent relevance 
of religion to morality and have expressed concern as to what will become of society if it 
were to become completely disillusioned with religion (e.g., Harris, 2011; Molyneux, 2016). 
If all people were to suddenly lose their belief in an omniscient and omnipotent moral arbiter 
and the possibility of ‘cosmic justice’ (e.g., eternal salvation for the virtuous and eternal 
damnation for the wicked), what equivalent incentives would remain to promote moral 
behaviour (D’Souza, 2009)? 
Despite all of this, several recent studies and a recent meta-analysis have cast some 
doubt upon the religion-prosociality link (namely Galen, 2012; van Elk, Matzke, Gronau, 
Guan, Vandekerckhove & Wagenmakers, 2016). And while many studies have focused on 
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exploring whether a link between religiosity and prosociality exists, less attention – in the 
form of empirical studies – has been devoted to uncovering why such a link has been 
observed (Saleam & Moustafa, 2016). Numerous hypotheses have been proposed (e.g., the 
‘supernatural monitoring hypothesis’ and the ‘supernatural punishment hypothesis’) to 
account for the apparent link between religiosity and prosociality. However, many of the 
studies which have been conducted to specifically test these hypotheses have yielded findings 
that are open to multiple plausible interpretations (often due to methodological 
flaws/shortcomings) or have not been subjected to attempts at replication. 
The ‘supernatural reward hypothesis’ (SRH) is a prime example of a partial 
explanation of the apparent link between religiosity and prosociality, which has been 
subjected to minimal empirical testing. The SRH posits that the divine rewards promised to 
religious adherents in their respective holy texts/traditions can promote prosocial behaviour 
because the receipt of these divine rewards is often said to be contingent upon the 
piety/righteousness of one’s conduct (Saleam & Moustafa, 2016; also see Harrell, 2012). 
That is, people who behave morally, in the context of a particular religious tradition (e.g., 
Islam), are those who can expect to receive divine rewards (e.g., an eternity in Heaven) for 
their deeds. Indeed, many of the supernatural rewards (e.g., eternal life) offered in the world’s 
religious traditions appeal directly to many of our Darwinian instincts (e.g., the survival 
instinct), and this makes them particularly alluring to people who subscribe to those traditions 
(Saad, 2011). However, while this account is plausible, only a single empirical study (Harrell, 
2012) has tested it. 
The main objective of this thesis is to explore whether or not reward-related religious 
concepts can effectively promote moral behaviour. To achieve this end, this thesis begins 
with a discussion of the nature of the apparent link between religious belief and prosociality.  
This is followed by an in-depth discussion of various hypotheses that have been proposed to 
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explain this religion-prosociality link, with a particular focus on the SRH. This discussion 
provides the rationale and basis for three studies (see below) conducted to empirically test the 
SRH. 
Literature Review 
The ‘Religion-Prosociality Link’ 
 Religious traditions are, and have tended to be, very deeply concerned with ethics and 
morality, and hence, it is unsurprising that many theorists and researchers have drawn a link 
between religious belief and morality/prosociality; a link which has received a great deal of 
attention in the psychological literature. There is now a vast literature devoted to the study of 
the so-called ‘religion-prosociality link’. Studies spanning many cultures and religious groups 
have often found that people who are more devoutly religious (e.g., as measured by church 
attendance or self-report data, etc.) tend to behave more prosocially than people who are less 
devout or are non-religious (Heineck, 2014; Regnerus, Smith & Sikkink, 1998; Shariff, 
Willard, Andersen & Norenzayan, 2016; Stavrova & Siegers, 2014). In the study conducted 
by Stavrova and Siegers, which included data from over 70 countries, it was found that the 
extent of peoples’ personal levels of religious devotion correlated positively with charitable 
giving (a common measure of prosociality) and correlated negatively with numerous 
measures of anti-sociality (e.g., number of traffic offenses committed, and willingness to buy 
stolen goods). 
 Researchers have often explained these results by appealing to the moral prescriptions 
and proscriptions within today’s religious traditions (e.g., Johnson, 2016; Saleam & 
Moustafa, 2016; Stavrova & Siegers, 2014). If a person subscribes to a religion that instructs 
him/her to behave morally and believes that his/her behaviour is being monitored by morally-
judgemental supernatural beings who have the power to reward or punish mortals, then it 
would be wise for that person to behave morally (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). Religious 
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rituals and gatherings may also promote trust and positive feelings towards coreligionists 
(i.e., people who belong to the same religion or religious sect), which may result in increased 
in-group prosociality (van Cappellen, Saroglou & Toth-Gauthier, 2016). Indeed, there are 
many plausible mechanisms through which religious belief may be exerting its apparent 
effect on prosociality. 
 But while many researchers in the field have focused on exploring what aspects of 
religious beliefs/traditions may underlie the religion-prosociality effect, there are also 
researchers in the field who question whether a clear link between religious belief(s) and 
prosociality exists at all. As was noted in the previous section, the religion-prosociality link is 
certainly not without its critics/sceptics. For example, Galen (2012) noted that while many 
studies have found that religious people behave more prosocially (e.g., display greater 
generosity in experimental settings) than nonreligious people (e.g., Ahmed, 2009; Sosis & 
Ruffle, 2003), many studies have failed to demonstrate a relationship between religiosity and 
prosociality (e.g., Ahmed & Salas, 2009; Bellemare & Kröger, 2007). Furthermore, the 
effects observed in many of the studies that have yielded findings supportive of the religion-
prosociality hypothesis may be partly explainable by appealing to in-group bias (i.e., the 
tendency to favour others who share particular characteristics and/or beliefs with oneself, 
such as adherence to the same religious doctrine). For example, Ahmed (2009) found that 
highly religious students were more cooperative (in a ‘public goods’ game) and generous (in 
the ‘Dictator Game’) than nonreligious students, but noted that religious students were taking 
financial risks in religious school settings, while nonreligious students were not being tested 
in explicitly nonreligious/atheistic settings (e.g., at an atheists’ or secular club on a university 
campus). Hence, while religious students could safely expect the targets of their generosity to 
be coreligionists, nonreligious people had no assurances at all that the targets of their 
generosity would be ideologically similar to them. 
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 Another issue confronting the religion-prosociality hypothesis is that while many 
studies have demonstrated positive correlations between religiosity and self-reported levels of 
prosociality, fewer studies have demonstrated that higher levels of religiosity correlate with 
higher levels of actual prosocial behaviour (Duhaime, 2015). Galen (2012) argued that part 
of the religion-prosociality effect may stem from socially-desirable responding. That is, 
religious people may simply claim to be more prosocial than they actually are, and there is 
some empirical support for this claim (e.g., see Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). However, an 
interesting finding from the study conducted by Stavrova and Siegers (2014; summarised 
above) was that the religion-prosociality effect was most pronounced in non-theocratic 
contexts. That is, in societies wherein religious adherence is not enforced upon the 
population, the correlation between personal religious devotion and behavioural prosociality 
was the highest. As Stavrova and Siegers argued, if social-desirability was a significant 
underpinning of the religion-prosociality effect, then one would expect the effect to be more 
pronounced in theocratic contexts, as theocratic states tend to enforce moral norms more 
strictly than more liberal states, and hence, there would be a greater incentive to respond in 
ways that are consistent with these norms. And yet, the religion-prosociality effect is actually 
less pronounced in theocratic states. 
 Another striking problem with any simplistic account of a link between religious 
belief and prosociality is the fact that religious beliefs can inspire thoughts and behaviours 
that appear to be explicitly antisocial (Galen; 2012; Harris, 2006). For example, a Pew 
Research survey found that 86% of Egyptian Muslim respondents, 79% of Afghani Muslim 
respondents, 76% of Pakistani Muslim respondents, and 62% of Malaysian Muslim 
respondents approved of the death penalty as a punishment for apostasy (Pew Research 
Center, 2013). In a meta-analysis of studies conducted (at least predominantly) in the United 
States, exploring the relationship between religiosity and racism, Hall, Matz and Wood 
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(2010) found that while certain aspects of religiosity (e.g., ‘quest religiosity’ and 
agnosticism) were conducive to racial tolerance, the more collectivistic/group-oriented 
elements (e.g., religious fundamentalism) were associated with higher levels of racial 
prejudice. Additionally, an empirical study with a predominantly Christian sample found that 
subliminally priming participants with Christian concepts (e.g., ‘bible’, ‘Christ’, ‘Jesus’) 
resulted in increased scores (relative to a control group) on measures of covert and overt 
racial prejudice towards African-Americans (Johnson, Rowatt & LaBouff, 2010). 
Collectively, these findings are somewhat unsurprising as many religious texts often overtly 
promote prejudices, sometimes even promoting hatred and violence against particular groups 
(e.g., 1 Timothy 2:9-15; 2 Nephi 5:21-231; Leviticus 20:13; Qur’an 7:80-81). 
 Given that religion appears to promote antisocial behaviour, just as it often promotes 
prosocial behaviour (e.g., Ephesians 4:32; John 8; Qur’an 2:274, 16:91), the notion of a 
religion-prosociality link seems misleading. Religions may promote antisocial behaviours in 
some instances, and prosocial behaviours in others, and which behaviours are promoted in 
particular circumstances will vary across different religious traditions and contexts (Saleam 
& Moustafa, 2016). Furthermore, what is considered to be antisocial or prosocial also differs 
across religions and contexts. Clearly, the relationship between religious belief and 
behaviours/thoughts is highly complex, and there is much debate regarding how religion 
influences believers. 
This thesis specifically explores the ways in which religious beliefs influence people 
to behave in prosocial ways, rather than how religion can influence people to behave 
antisocially. Although the literature linking religious belief to attitudinal and behavioural 
prosociality is flawed, researchers in recent times have utilised priming paradigms to explore 
whether the subtle activation of religious concepts in the mind is enough to promote prosocial 
                                                 
1 2 Nephi is one of the scriptural books contained within the Book of Mormon. 
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behaviour (Batara, Franco, Quiachon & Sembrero, 2016; Shariff et al., 2016). Despite his 
clear and justified reservations about the state of the religion-prosociality literature, even 
Galen (2012) noted that studies utilising priming paradigms have tended to offer more 
reliable support for the religion-prosociality hypothesis. The proceeding sections explore and 
critique the religion-prosociality priming literature. 
Religious Priming Studies 
 Given the difficulty involved in accounting for and controlling the many extraneous 
variables which may influence the results of correlational studies exploring the religion-
prosociality link, researchers have regularly turned to the use of priming techniques (Shariff 
et al., 2016). Priming involves exposing participants to a particular stimulus (or series of 
stimuli) and exploring whether exposure to that stimulus (or series of stimuli) influenced their 
performance and/or responses in a subsequent task (Molden, 2014).  
 In a typical religious priming study, participants will be randomly assigned to one of 
several groups. The simplest religious priming study will involve one group of participants 
being exposed to a religious prime (e.g., a religious image, text, sound, or word), and a 
control group of participants being exposed to a control prime (e.g., a random image, text, 
sound, or word) or no prime at all. The majority of studies in the religious priming literature 
involve the use of explicit priming techniques and/or implicit priming techniques; although, 
subliminal priming techniques have also been utilised for several studies in the psychology of 
religion field (e.g., see Harrell, 2012; Pichon et al., 2007). 
Explicit primes are conspicuous, and participants’ active and conscious contemplation 
of the prime is assured. Consequently, however, there is an increased risk that participants 
will become aware of what the researcher is investigating, and this may affect the results 
(e.g., by introducing demand characteristics). One major advantage that explicit priming 
techniques have over implicit techniques (explained below) is that they allow researchers to 
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prime participants with more specific and complex concepts, as there is no need to simplify 
or conceal complex concepts in an effort to reduce the likelihood of participants becoming 
aware of the study’s aims (Shariff et al., 2016). An example of an explicit priming study 
could involve a researcher exploring how the glorification of violence by religious authorities 
influences moral attitudes. The researcher could simply have participants read a long passage 
of scriptural text outlining God’s condoning of violent acts by believers (e.g., in Numbers 
31), and then have them respond to a survey probing their moral attitudes/beliefs. This would 
be an explicit priming technique, as participants reading the text will be actively engaging 
with the exact concept of interest (i.e., sanctified violence in religious texts). 
On the other hand, implicit primes are designed to be subtle, and are generally 
favoured because there is a reduced risk of participants becoming aware of the study’s aims. 
One shortcoming inherent in implicit priming techniques is that the concepts being primed 
need to be relatively simple, as more detailed and complex primes may demand more 
conscious effort to process, and this could result in participants becoming aware of the 
study’s aims. An example of an implicit priming paradigm commonly utilised in the religious 
priming literature is the ‘sentence unscrambling task’ (SUT; Srull & Wyer, 1979), wherein 
participants are presented with several sets of randomly arranged words and are asked to 
rearrange them so that a coherent sentence is formed. In the religious priming literature, the 
word-sets given will contain religious words (e.g., ‘church’, ‘God’, ‘Jesus’), and it is 
expected that exposure to those words will activate religious concepts in participants’ minds; 
although, participants will be told that they are simply completing a word-puzzle task. 
Following the SUT, participants will complete a task assessing their attitudinal and/or 
behavioural prosociality to assess whether exposure to the religious primes influences 
prosociality. 
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Priming studies are generally favourable because they allow researchers to explore 
possible causal effects that religious concepts can have on participants’ attitudes and/or 
behaviours (Batara et al., 2016). If participants are randomly assigned to their respective 
groups, and known extraneous variables (e.g., socioeconomic circumstances) are adequately 
controlled, any differences observed between those groups can sensibly be concluded to be 
due to the effects elicited by the different kinds of primes (e.g., religious primes or 
neutral/control primes) in each condition. Given the capacity of priming studies to uncover 
possible causal effects, there is now a growing body of literature exploring whether the 
activation of religious concepts via priming can produce effects on moral attitudes/behaviour. 
Many studies in recent years have demonstrated that religious primes are effective in 
producing prosocial effects. For example, Randolph-Seng and Nielsen (2007) found that 
participants who were exposed to religious word primes (e.g., ‘heaven’, ‘prayer’) in the SUT 
cheated less in a subsequent task than participants exposed to sport-related and control primes 
did. Additionally, in their second study, Randolph-Seng and Nielsen found that participants 
who scored highly on an intrinsic religiosity measure who were exposed to subliminal 
religious primes (e.g., ‘church’, ‘saint’) also cheated less than intrinsically-religious 
participants in the control condition. In another priming study, Rand, Dreber, Haque, Kane, 
Nowak and Coakley (2014; Study 1) had Christian participants read generosity-related 
biblical passages (2 Corinthians 8:9-15 and Mark 10:17-23) and had them rate the extent to 
which the passage resonated with them along a 7-point Likert scale. Rand et al. found that 
participants who provided higher ratings (as to how well the passage resonated with them) 
were more cooperative in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game than were participants who 
gave lower ratings. Many other priming studies have also demonstrated a positive religious 
priming effect on prosociality (e.g., Aveyard, 2014, Study 2; Batara et al., 2016; Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2007). Such findings clearly support the religion-prosociality hypothesis. 
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Not all priming studies have yielded results in support of the religion-prosociality 
hypothesis, however. For example, Benjamin, Choi and Fisher (2016) conducted a study 
testing whether participants primed with religious concepts in an SUT paradigm would give 
away more money than control group participants in the Dictator Game (wherein participants 
are given a small sum of money and are asked to split the money however they please 
between themselves and an anonymous – actually non-existent – other participant). In 
addition to their own data, Benjamin et al. included the data from Shariff and Norenzayan 
(2007) and Ahmed and Salas (2011), in what was essentially a small-scale meta-analysis. 
Having analysed the collated data, Benjamin et al. failed to find an effect of religious primes 
on generosity in the Dictator Game. In another priming study, featuring participants from the 
United Arab Emirates, Aveyard (2014, Study 1) found that priming participants with 
religious concepts using an SUT priming paradigm did not influence honesty in a subsequent 
task. 
Despite such null findings as those outlined above, a recent meta-analysis conducted 
by Shariff et al. (2016) found that there was a significant religious priming effect on 
prosociality. Notably, Shariff et al. explored whether the evidence in support of the religion-
prosociality hypothesis in the priming literature was robust to possible publication bias and 
concluded that this was the case. However, van Elk et al. (2016) criticised the meta-analysis 
conducted by Shariff et al., noting that the technique utilised to control for the effects of 
publication bias (the ‘trim-and-fill’ method) may not have been ideal for this purpose, and 
noted that the criteria for inclusion/exclusion of studies featured in the meta-analysis were 
questionable. Given these concerns, van Elk et al. re-examined the data collated by Shariff et 
al. using two different meta-analytic techniques: the Precision-Effect Testing–Precision-
Effect-Estimate with Standard Error (PET-PEESE) technique and the Bayesian Bias 
Correction (BBC) technique. While the BBC meta-analysis yielded a religious priming effect 
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robust to the effects of publication bias, the results from the PET-PEESE meta-analysis 
suggested that the effect of religious primes could be wholly attributed to publication bias. 
This led van Elk et al. to conclude that meta-analyses cannot settle the debate as to whether 
religious primes truly do influence prosociality, and that only pre-registered replication 
studies (studies which are accepted for publication prior to the results being obtained) with 
large sample sizes could achieve this end. 
Given this recent controversy, it is now particularly important that researchers focus 
on whether particular religious primes produce more reliable effects than others. If religious 
primes truly do increase attitudinal and behavioural prosociality, then why is this so? Do 
religious primes in general produce prosocial effects, or do certain kinds of religious primes 
achieve this end more effectively than others? Religions are not monolithic constructs; they 
are highly complex and have many components, and so it is likely that primes that are 
relevant to different aspects of religious belief (e.g., punishment-related aspects, such as Hell, 
and reward-related aspects, such as Heaven) will influence religious people differently. 
Indeed, there is now a growing body of empirical literature suggesting precisely this.  
Particular Primes, Particular Effects 
The vast majority of priming studies in the literature have approached the relationship 
between religiosity and prosociality in a rather broad way. Most such studies have utilised a 
diverse range of religious primes (e.g., ‘heaven’, ‘hell’, ‘God’, ‘Bible’, ‘church’, etc.) which 
are related only in the sense that they are relevant to religion (Ritter & Preston, 2013). Only a 
handful of studies have explored the ways in which specific kinds of religious primes can 
elicit particular effects (DeBono, Shariff, Poole & Muraven, 2017; Preston & Ritter, 2013; 
Saleam & Moustafa, 2016). 
The obvious issue that arises from the use of a broad spectrum of distinct religious 
primes is that the resultant effects observed will be difficult to explain. The simplistic 
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explanation would be that the effects demonstrate that religious beliefs/thoughts, in general, 
promote prosociality. However, if distinct kinds of religious primes elicit distinct effects, then 
it is possible that only some of the primes being utilised are producing the effects, while 
others are not producing any attitudinal or behavioural changes, or may even be eliciting 
conflicting effects. Knowledge of which particular primes underlie the effects observed in 
religious priming studies will offer insight into why those effects are being observed. 
As DeBono et al. (2017) noted, ‘religion’ is neither a simple nor monolithic construct; 
religion is highly multifaceted. Acknowledging the multifaceted nature of religion, many 
researchers have posited hypotheses accounting for how specific elements of religious 
traditions can promote particular attitudes and behaviours. For example, the ‘supernatural 
monitoring hypothesis’ (SMH) posits that because most religious traditions promote the idea 
that we are under constant surveillance by supernatural agents, priming people with religious 
concepts could increase prosociality by making people feel as though they are being watched 
(Atkinson & Bourrat, 2011; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). This feeling could translate into 
increased prosociality because people tend to behave more prosocially when they feel as 
though they are being watched by other people, as opposed to when they are alone (Haley & 
Fessler, 2005; Powell, Roberts & Nettle, 2012). This effect may be reflective of people’s 
concerns regarding the enhancement and maintenance of their public reputations (Piazza & 
Bering, 2008). Hence, given the SMH, one might predict that exposure to agent-based 
religious primes (e.g., primes that involve religious agents, such as ‘Jesus’, ‘God’ or ‘spirit’) 
– relative to, for example, institution-based religious primes (e.g., ‘chapel’, ‘church’) – may 
make religious people behave more prosocially. Indeed, Gervais and Norenzayan (2012) 
found not only that having people think about God (during a priming task) led to highly 
religious participants (relative to less or non- religious participants) expressing greater levels 
of public self-awareness, but also that priming religious people with religious words (e.g., 
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‘God’, ‘prophet’, ‘spirit’) resulted in them responding in more socially-desirable ways during 
a subsequent task (Study 2). Perhaps this exaggeration in religious participants’ prosociality 
resulting from exposure to agent-related religious primes, as indicated by their socially-
desirable responding on paper, will translate into actual increases in prosocial behaviour.2 
The findings of several recent studies offer clear support for the notion that 
conceptually-distinct religious primes elicit distinct effects. For example, Harrell (2012) 
found that subliminal reward-related religious primes (e.g., ‘miracle’, ‘salvation’) increased 
behavioural prosociality, while more neutral religious primes (e.g., ‘cross’, ‘temple’) 
produced no effect on behavioural prosociality.3 In another study, Yilmaz and Bahçekapili 
(2016, Study 1) found that implicitly priming participants with punishment-related religious 
words (e.g., ‘hell’, ‘devil’) increased their attitudinal prosociality, while unsorted re ligious 
primes (e.g., ‘grace’, ‘spirit’) had no effect on prosociality. Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016, 
Study 2) also found that people who read a passage of text talking about Allah’s tendency to 
punish people for their misdeeds responded more positively on measures of attitudinal 
prosociality – while participants who read a passage of text referring to Allah’s kindness and 
mercifulness responded no more positively – than control group participants. 
These findings demonstrate that the simplistic categorisation of primes as either 
religious or secular is insufficient when trying to determine how religious beliefs/thoughts 
influence prosociality. In Harrell’s (2012) study, subliminal reward-related religious primes 
elicited identical effects to reward-related secular primes (e.g., ‘admire’, ‘applause’), and 
Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016, Study 1) found that punishment-related religious primes 
                                                 
2 Unfortunately, Gervais and Norenzayan (2012) did not use exclusively agent-related religious primes. For 
example, they also utilised ‘divine’ and ‘sacred’ as prime words. Hence, it is difficult to say whether the agent -
related primes alone account for the observed effects, or whether all of the primes underlay the effects on the 
basis that they all contain religious content. 
3 This study utilised a largely Christian sample. One problem with the reward-unrelated religious primes in this 
study was that they were not specific to Christianity, and many of the words used were lesser known (e.g., 
‘temple’ as opposed to ‘church’) or ambiguous (e.g., ‘cross’ as opposed to ‘crucifix’). This may have 
inadvertently lowered the probability that the reward-unrelated religious words would elicit noteworthy effects. 
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elicited identical effects to punishment-related secular primes (e.g., ‘police’, ‘prison’). These 
results suggest that the religious element is not what underlies the observed prosocial effects. 
Rather, it is whether the primes are reward-related or punishment-related, irrespective of 
whether or not those prime-words have religious connotations. 
Given these findings, it seems clear that religious primes elicit their effects not 
because they carry religious content in general, but because they carry content that appeals 
directly to our interests (e.g., rewards, punishments, etc.). Of course, for reward-related or 
punishment-related primes of any kind to be effective, the people exposed to those primes 
need to believe that the relevant prime-words reflect actual rewards and punishments. What is 
rewarding or punishing to one person may be meaningless to another, and what is considered 
to be a viable reward by a religious person (e.g., an eternity in Heaven) may be a mere fairy-
tale in the eyes of a non-religious person. Indeed, as Shariff et al. (2016) found in their meta-
analysis of the religion-prosociality priming literature, the prosocial effects of religious 
primes do not appear to generalise to non-religious people. A prime-word like ‘heaven’ may 
only produce a prosociality effect if people actually believe in Heaven, and so the religious 
element of the prime is not entirely irrelevant. However, given the nature of the effects 
observed, and given that the effects of religious primes are identical to those of conceptually-
equivalent (e.g., agent-related, reward-related, punishment-related) secular primes (Gervais & 
Norenzayan, 2012, Study 1; Harrell, 2012; Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016, Study 1), it seems 
clear that the effects elicited by religious primes depend on the particular contents of those 
primes. Hence, future researchers exploring the effects of religious primes would be well 
advised to develop distinct conceptual categories for the primes they intend to use. 
The Prominence of Reward and Punishment Concepts in Religious Traditions 
Given the data outlined in the previous section, the question arises: why is it that, at 
least in experimental settings, references to supernatural rewards and punishments elicit 
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prosocial effects, rather than, for example, anti-social effects?4 After all, while many studies 
have found that priming people with general (i.e., non-particular) religious primes can 
increase prosociality (e.g., Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007), some studies have found that 
priming people with general religious primes can result in increases in anti-social behaviour 
(e.g., Johnson et al., 2010). 
The predominant monotheistic religions of the modern era – namely Christianity and 
Islam – share a major theme in common: a focus on supernatural rewards and punishments 
(Johnson, 2016; Saleam & Moustafa, 2016). Christians and Muslims are promised that they 
will have an eternal afterlife in Heaven/Paradise if they believe in Christ/Allah and adhere to 
the teachings of the Bible/Qur’an. The following verses from the Bible and Qur’an attest to 
this: 
My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: And I give unto them 
eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my 
hand. – John 10:27-28 (KJV) 
Say, "Is that better or the Garden of Eternity which is promised to the righteous? It 
will be for them a reward and destination. For them therein is whatever they wish, 
[while] abiding eternally. It is ever upon your Lord a promise [worthy to be] 
requested. – Qur’an 25:15-16 (Sahih International Translation) 
Christians and Muslims are also threatened with the prospect of an eternity in Hell if they 
disbelieve and conduct themselves immorally. The following verses from the Bible and 
Qur’an attest to this: 
But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and 
whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the 
                                                 
4 What is considered prosocial or anti-social differs from society to society and from religion to religion. The 
findings of relevant studies seem to converge on the conclusion that such primes will promote behaviour which 
is prosocial within that sociocultural context, but further research should be done to test this explicitly. 
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lake which burneth with fire and brimstone: which is the second death. – Revelation 
21:8 (KJV) 
But as for those who defiantly disobeyed, their refuge is the Fire. Every time they wish 
to emerge from it, they will be returned to it while it is said to them, "Taste the 
punishment of the Fire which you used to deny." – Qur’an 32:20 (Sahih International 
Translation)  
Other mainstream religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, also contain 
supernatural reward and punishment elements. As D’Souza (2009) noted, the concept of 
‘karma’ adds an element of reciprocity to any moral equation. ‘Good karma’ in various 
Eastern religious traditions provides an incentive to behave morally (good things happen to 
good people), just as the concept of ‘bad karma’ discourages people from behaving 
immorally (bad things happen to bad people). Johnson (2016) noted that the concept of karma 
may be an even more effective means of promoting prosocial behaviour than monotheistic 
religions’ promises/threats of an eternity in Heaven or Hell, as one cannot simply 
apologise/repent in order to escape the consequences of bad karma. Indeed, karma is 
essentially a kind of “supernaturalistic cause and effect” (Saleam & Moustafa, 2016, pg.4), 
whereby one’s moral actions will eventually lead to positive outcomes for oneself, and one’s 
immoral actions will eventually lead to negative outcomes for oneself. 
 Even during ancient times, reward and punishment concepts featured – though not 
nearly as centrally – in a number of religious traditions. For example, in Ancient Egypt, it 
was believed that the deceased would be brought before the god Anubis, who would weigh 
their hearts against a feather from the goddess Maat, who was the divine embodiment of 
truth, morality, and justice (Armour, 2010; Carelli, 2011). If a person’s misdeeds in life had 
made his/her heart heavier than the feather of Maat, then his/her heart would be consumed by 
a crocodile-headed creature named Ammit, and this would prevent that person from 
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progressing to the afterlife and Paradise (Budge, 2011; Carelli, 2011). Moreover, in Ancient 
Greek mythology, though the gods were largely unconcerned with human morality (Stark, 
2008), it was said that virtuous people would go to the Elysium or to the Islands of the 
Blessed after death (Petrisko, 2000; Retief & Cilliers, 2006). While the gods of many ancient 
religions often made poor moral exemplars, as they were often highly capricious and cruel 
(Stark, 2008), it is nevertheless clear that concepts of divine rewards and punishments linked 
to moral/immoral conduct still featured in many of these early religions (Malinowski, 1935). 
Rather than being novel concepts in many of today’s religious traditions, divine reward and 
punishment concepts, linked to human moral conduct, have existed for millennia. 
 These concepts are not mere relics in religion that are not taken seriously by modern-
day religious people. Religious preachers and apologists regularly reference the divine 
rewards promised to righteous people, and the divine punishments promised to wicked 
people. Consider the following quote by Ravi Zacharias, a popular Christian preacher, which 
informs readers that the faithful adherents of Christianity will go to Heaven, while those who 
dismiss it will not: 
The mocker will not have the last laugh. You see, dancing on the grave of an 
extinguished Christianity is farcical at best. Because the grave is empty. And the one 
who knows the way out of the grave sits in the heavens and laughs. – Zacharias (2015) 
The following quote from a popular Christian apologist draws a clear link between morality 
and the afterlife: 
Virtually all conceptions of life after death, especially the religious conceptions, are 
rooted in the idea of cosmic justice… In all these doctrines, life after death is not a 
mere continuation of earthly existence, but rather a different kind of existence based 
on a settling of earthly accounts. These theories hold that even though we don’t 
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always find terrestrial justice, there is ultimate justice. In this future accounting, what 
goes around does come around. – D’Souza (2009, pg.180) 
Beliefs in Heaven and Hell have very real consequences for human well-being and 
mental health. For example, Shariff and Aknin (2014) found that belief in Heaven was 
associated with greater levels of self-reported happiness and life-satisfaction, while belief in 
Hell was associated with lower levels of self-reported happiness and life-satisfaction. Many 
religious people declare how terrified they are of going to Hell (e.g., see one account outlined 
by Dawkins, 2007, pg.317-318), and many books written about the reality of Heaven have 
achieved ‘best-seller’ status (e.g., Alexander, 2013; Burpo, 2011; Malarkey & Malarkey, 
2011; Piper & Murphey, 2014). Clearly, beliefs in supernatural rewards and punishments 
weigh heavily on the minds of believers. Of course, in order to obtain supernatural rewards 
(e.g., an eternity in Heaven), rather than harsh supernatural punishments (e.g., an eternity in 
Hell), one must believe and adhere to the teachings of their religious tradition and live a 
righteous life. Hence, it would be wise for believers to behave morally, if they wish to 
achieve positive outcomes and/or avoid negative outcomes. 
The Supernatural Punishment Hypothesis 
The notion that the punishment-related elements of religion are effective at promoting 
prosociality and dissuading anti-sociality is known as the ‘supernatural punishment 
hypothesis’ (SPH; Johnson, 2005). According to the SPH, the belief that invisible 
supernatural agents and forces exist, and can bring misfortune or pain to wrongdoers, acts as 
a strong disincentive for immoral behaviour. As the previous section outlined, today’s 
predominant holy texts contain a plethora of references to the punishments that wrongdoers 
will receive (e.g., Qur’an 4:10; Revelation 21:8) and the punishments that wrongdoers have 
supposedly already suffered throughout history (e.g., Exodus 14:21-31; Qur’an 29:39-40); 
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hence, believers are given strong reminders of the link between disobedience and 
punishment. 
Many researchers exploring the link between religious belief and prosociality have 
argued that the punishment-related elements of various religious traditions may have played a 
particularly important role in the development of largescale cooperation, which is required 
for the building of vast societies like those of the modern era (Johnson, 2016; Yilmaz & 
Bahçekapili, 2016). In order for largescale societies to form, according to this account, there 
would need to be widely accepted/presumed penalties for cheaters and defectors, which 
would be sufficient to dissuade the vast majority of people from ever engaging in these anti-
social activities (Johnson & Bering, 2006). Belief in the existence of morally-interested 
supernatural agents who can punish anti-social activities may have satisfied these criteria. 
 It could be argued, however, that secular systems of punishment could also meet such 
a standard. After all, humans have lived in societies with governments and penal systems for 
millennia. However, in the context of human history, as Johnson and Krüger (2004) argued, 
largescale secular societal systems for dealing with defectors (i.e., governments and legal 
systems) are relatively recent innovations. Belief in punitive supernatural agents may have 
played a significant role in the promotion of cooperation and prosociality in human 
prehistory, before the formation of secular systems. Perhaps such beliefs made the formation 
of largescale secular systems possible (Johnson, 2016). 
 One particular benefit of supernaturalistic systems of punishment, relative to secular 
systems of punishment, is that some of the costs of enforcement are outsourced to a 
supernatural being, thereby reducing the costs to righteous believers who no longer need to 
carry the entire burden of enforcement (Johnson, 2005). While religious communities still 
utilise secular punishments (e.g., exile, imprisonment, fines and torture), the looming threat 
of powerful supernatural punishments (e.g., eternal agony after death) may dissuade sizable 
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numbers of people from committing crimes, thereby relieving pressure on a given society’s 
secular penal system (Johnson, 2005). Furthermore, even if a prospective criminal was highly 
confident that he/she could avoid detection and thereby escape secular punishment(s) for 
his/her misdeed(s), he/she could have no certain way of avoiding detection and punishment 
by supernatural agents. Arguably, this is a major advantage that supernatural punishment 
systems have over secular punishment systems. 
Recent findings in the religion-prosociality literature support this contention. For 
example, Shariff and Rhemtulla (2012) found a negative correlation between belief in Hell 
and national crime rates, using data from World Values Surveys (WVS) and European Value 
Surveys from a total of 67 countries.5 In another study, spanning 186 societies around the 
world, Johnson (2005) found that belief in moralising high gods (MHGs) correlated with 
several metrics of societal cooperation (e.g., lending of money and payment of taxes). 
Johnson argued that this relation may stem from the fact that MHGs tend to threaten 
wrongdoers with divine punishments. 
The SPH is also supported by the findings from several recent empirical studies. For 
example, Hadnes and Schumacher (2012) found that participants primed with traditional 
religious concepts (with an emphasis on punishment) were more likely to risk the 
endowments they were given in the Trust Game (see Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995) than 
were participants in the control group. Participants exposed to these religious primes also 
gave away higher sums of money than participants in the control condition in the Trust 
Game. Additionally, the results of two empirical studies conducted by Yilmaz and 
Bahçekapili (2016) found that the explicit and implicit priming of religious participants with 
punishment-related religious concepts was sufficient to increase their attitudinal prosociality.  
                                                 
5 The results of this study are explored further in the next section. 
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 While the SPH has received a great deal of attention in the religion-prosociality 
literature, the supernatural reward hypothesis (SRH) has received very little attention. The 
evidence in support of the SRH, as well as the reasons for its neglect in the literature, are 
explored below. 
The Neglect of the Supernatural Reward Hypothesis (SRH) 
While many studies have investigated the merits of the SPH, only one empirical study 
has directly explored the effects of reward-related religious primes on prosocial behaviour 
(i.e., Harrell, 2012; see above). Besides the findings of Harrell (2012), the findings of only 
one other empirical study provide tentative support to the SRH. Pichon, Boccato and 
Saroglou (2007; Study 1) found that participants exposed to religious primes with positive 
connotations (e.g., ‘Christmas’, ‘salvation’) chose to distribute larger numbers of pamphlets 
for charities than participants who were exposed to neutral religious primes (e.g., ‘parish’, 
‘temple’), positive secular primes (e.g., ‘smile’, ‘thanks’), and neutral secular primes (e.g., 
‘balance’, ‘switch’). Harrell noted that several of the positive religious prime-words used in 
this study were reward-related, which suggests that the mere presence of generically positive 
content may not be what produced the prosocial effects observed by Pichon et al., but rather, 
it may have been the reward-related elements producing the effects observed. 
One factor underlying the lack of attention devoted to the SRH is the notion that 
punishments are far more effective than rewards when it comes to the promotion of 
prosociality (Shariff, 2008). As Johnson and Bering (2006) argued, rewards tend to be 
effective at encouraging some people to cooperate, but rewards cannot prevent all people 
from cheating. When it comes to cooperation, people have nothing to lose and much to gain 
by defecting. However, a system (e.g., a culture, religion or legal code) that promises to 
punish defectors has the capacity to encourage all people to cooperate and to deter all people 
from defecting. Arguably, systems based on supernatural punishment can achieve these ends, 
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just as secular systems (e.g., governments with penal systems) are designed to achieve these 
ends today (Johnson and Krüger, 2004). 
It is noteworthy that there are few, if any, secular systems within which 
governments/authorities focus on rewarding people for doing good deeds. Contrastively, all 
modern-day legal systems punish (e.g., through imprisonment) individuals who break the 
law. Divine reward concepts may have emerged later and/or simply to enhance the effects of 
punishment-based systems by providing an additional incentive for people to cooperate (e.g., 
in Christianity and Islam, believers do not only avoid Hell through their religious adherence; 
they will also be rewarded with eternal life in Heaven/Paradise). 
The notion that belief in supernatural punishments promotes cooperation and 
prosociality more effectively than belief in supernatural benevolence and rewards is 
supported by the fact that many pre-industrial societies believed in exclusively punitive and 
vengeful supernatural agents, while very few pre-industrial societies have embraced belief in 
exclusively benevolent supernatural agents (Johnson & Bering, 2006). It is argued that the 
commonality of systems centred on supernatural punishments, relative to systems centred on 
supernatural benevolence/rewards, suggests that supernatural punishments have greater 
societal utility than supernatural benevolence/reward beliefs (e.g., perhaps such beliefs 
produce more stable societies by increasing cooperation and prosociality). On this account, 
belief in benevolent supernatural agents and supernatural rewards has, at most, a minor 
influence on cooperation and prosociality. 
 Despite this, the superiority of divine punishments over divine rewards with regard to 
the promotion of cooperation and prosociality does not preclude the possibility that the 
expectation of divine rewards can, and does, motivate believers to behave prosocially. 
Indeed, as was previously noted, Harrell (2012) found that the subliminal priming of reward-
related concepts was sufficient to increase generosity in anonymous settings (also see Pichon 
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et al., 2007). However, the limited evidence supporting the SRH is difficult to interpret, as 
there are other findings in the religion-prosociality literature that appear to contradict it. For 
example, running contrary to the predictions of the SRH, Shariff and Rhemtulla (2012) found 
that the extent to which belief in Heaven exceeds belief in Hell, in a given country, positively 
correlated with national crime-rates. That is, in countries within which higher proportions of 
people believe in Heaven, crime-rates are higher. Shariff and Rhemtulla also found that the 
extent to which belief in Hell exceeds belief in Heaven in a given country negatively 
correlated with national crime-rates. On the basis of these findings, Shariff and Rhemtulla 
concluded that belief in punitive supernatural agents is more conducive to the reduction of 
antisocial behaviour relative to belief in benevolent supernatural agents. 
 Several empirical studies have yielded further evidence supporting the idea that 
benevolent gods are unideal when it comes to promoting prosociality. Shariff and 
Norenzayan (2011) asked participants to rate the extent to which certain words reflected what 
they believed God’s nature to be. Either before or after providing these ratings, participants 
completed a mathematical quiz, within which there were simple ways to cheat. Shariff and 
Norenzayan found that participants’ ratings of God as ‘compassionate’, ‘loving’, ‘peaceful’, 
and so on, correlated positively with the number of times they cheated during the quiz task; 
whereas participants’ ratings of God as ‘harsh’, ‘terrifying’, ‘vengeful’, and so on, correlated 
negatively with the number of times they cheated. Similarly, by using an explicit priming 
paradigm, Card (2013, Study 2) found that participants who read a passage about a 
benevolent God cheated more often on a subsequent quiz task than participants who read a 
passage about an all-powerful God and participants who read a passage of text referring to 
the mental health benefits that result from the consumption of fatty fish (the control condition 
passage). Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016, Study 2) also obtained results suggesting that 
benevolent gods may be unideal for the promotion of prosocial behaviour. While participants 
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who read a passage of text about Allah’s vengefulness and punishments expressed higher 
attitudinal prosociality (relative to control group participants) in a subsequent task, 
participants who read a passage of text about Allah’s mercifulness and forgiveness did not 
differ from control group participants in terms of attitudinal prosociality. 
 Taken together, the results of the studies outlined above appear to pose a significant 
challenge for the SRH. If participants primed with benevolent God concepts behave more 
antisocially than those primed with punitive God concepts (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007), and 
no more prosocially than control group participants (Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016, Study 2), 
then it would appear that divine rewards are relatively ineffective at increasing prosociality 
and decreasing anti-sociality. However, one major problem with disregarding the SRH on the 
basis of the findings outlined above is that, while the aforementioned findings all converge to 
suggest that benevolent deities are generally ineffective when it comes to the promotion of 
prosociality, it does not follow that divine rewards (a specific kind of divine benevolence) are 
ineffective at promoting prosociality. Indeed, belief in Heaven (or other divine rewards) is 
not tantamount to belief in a benevolent and forgiving deity. Consider the Biblical (John 
10:27-28; Revelation 21:8) and Qur’anic (25:15-16; 32:20) verses quoted above. The gods 
reflected by those verses harshly punish immoral conduct and greatly reward moral conduct. 
A god could, theoretically, be angry and vengeful while still promising to reward people who 
behave morally. Similarly, a god could be friendly and loving while still promising to harshly 
punish those who harm others. 
 Perhaps a mistaken conflation of divine benevolence and divine rewards explains the 
lack of research testing the SRH. The lone empirical study directly examining the merits of 
the SRH (Harrell, 2012; also see Pichon et al., 2007) found that reward-related religious 
primes did promote positive behavioural prosociality (generosity, in this instance). Hence, the 
differentiation between divine benevolence and divine rewards is certainly not without merit. 
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Were the results outlined above (i.e., Card, 2013, Study 2; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011; 
Shariff & Rhemtulla, 2012; Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016, Study 2) sufficient to refute the 
SRH, then the results obtained by Harrell (2012) – and perhaps Pichon et al. – would be 
difficult to explain. However, only further experimentation can determine whether the SRH is 
correct or not, and any experiments designed to achieve this end should differentiate between 
divine benevolence and divine rewards. Study 1 (below) was designed with these 
considerations in mind. 
The Present Research 
 Given the lack of research focusing explicitly on the SRH, and given the recent 
controversies regarding publication bias (i.e., the successful publication of studies with 
positive findings, possibly complemented by a lack of publications of studies that failed to 
detect a religion-prosociality effect) in the religion-prosociality literature (see van Elk et al., 
2016), the replication and expansion of the findings of Harrell (2012) is required. The study 
outlined in the next section was designed to replicate the findings of Harrell (i.e., that reward-
related religious primes increase behavioural prosociality) using an explicit priming 
methodology (whereas Harrell, 2012, utilised a subliminal priming paradigm). 
As was previously noted, one advantage of using explicit priming paradigms is that 
the primes used can convey complex messages that subliminal and implicit primes cannot 
(Shariff et al., 2016). On this basis, explicit reward-related religious primes may be preferable 
because participants will not only be presented with reward-related religious words but also 
with a coherent narrative that speaks about the value of those rewards, and how they can be 
obtained. Essentially, participants will be thinking about exactly what the experimenter wants 
them to think about. 
The measure of prosociality in this study will be the amount of money participants 
give away in the Dictator Game (see Procedure section), which was the same measure of 
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 27 
 
  
behavioural prosociality utilised by Harrell (2012). It was hypothesised that participants who 
read the reward-related religious passage would give away more money in the Dictator Game 
than would participants who read a passage of text focusing on God’s benevolence and 
mercifulness or a control text (in this case, a text about communication).  
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Method 
Participants 
All participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) system. 
MTurk is an online marketplace which allows people to advertise tasks that they would like 
to have completed, while prospective participants are able to see those tasks and select which 
ones they are interested in completing (Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011). Participants 
are paid for their time, as per the pay offered in the MTurk advertisements for any given task.  
Prospective participants first responded to a short survey asking what religion they 
subscribe to, what country they reside in, and how deeply religious they consider themselves 
to be. Those who identified as being religious, and who gave a score of 4 or higher along the 
7-point religiosity scale were eligible to participate in the study. Participation was restricted 
to Western nations. 
This resulted in the recruitment of a total of 102 participants (36 males; 66 females; 
all over 18 years of age). Of these 102 participants, a total of 11 participants were excluded 
from the study. 6 participants were excluded from the analysis on the basis that they 
expressed – in response to the suspicion probe – fairly accurate knowledge as to what the 
purpose of the study was, and such knowledge may have influenced giving behaviour. One 
participant was removed from the analysis because his/her responses to the suspicion probe 
and other short-response questions were irrelevant to the questions being asked, and hence, 
did not make sense in context. Another 2 participants were excluded from the analysis 
because their attempts reflected a conspicuous lack of effort (e.g., identical responses to 
distinct questions, and unrealistically fast study completion times: ~3 minutes). The other 2 
participants were excluded because they expressed strong theological disagreement with the 
content of the priming passage in the religious reward condition (i.e., that good deeds and 
divine rewards are completely unlinked in Christian doctrine), which may have influenced 
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the ultimate response on the dependent variable (e.g., by rousing annoyance and/or 
defensiveness in participants). These exclusions resulted in a final sample of 91 participants 
(33 males; 58 females). The vast majority of the participants were Christians (N = 86),6 while 
the sample also included 4 Jews and 1 Buddhist. 
All participants – excluding those who were excluded for a lack of effort or for giving 
incoherent responses – were paid $1.03(USD) for their participation, in addition to however 
much money they decided to keep in the Dictator Game (see below). 
Procedure 
The methodology of this study was derived from that utilised by Yilmaz and 
Bahçekapili (2016, Study 2), with some minor deviations.7 For example, their religious 
punishment condition was replaced with a religious reward condition. Unlike the study 
conducted by Yilmaz and Bahçekapili, this study utilised a behavioural measure of prosociality 
(i.e., the Dictator Game), rather than a measure of prosocial attitudes (i.e., a survey asking 
participants how likely they would be to help others in a given situation). Additionally, unlike 
the study conducted by Yilmaz and Bahçekapili, this study was conducted online, rather than 
in-person. Proof of ethics approval for this study is provided in Appendix A.8 
 Priming phase. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 
religious reward (RR), religious kindness (RK), or the control condition. To counter the 
possibility of participants becoming aware of the study’s purpose, participants were told that 
they were participating in two ‘separate sub-studies’ (mild deception). Participants were told 
that they had 60 minutes to complete both ‘studies’.  
After reading the study information (see Appendix B), participants were asked whether 
they consider themselves to be fluent in English. Those who answered ‘No’ were excluded 
                                                 
6 One of these Christian participants identified as a Mormon. 
7 Permission to use and adapt this priming procedure was obtained from Onurcan Yilmaz of Dogus University in 
Turkey via a personal correspondence. 
8 This ethics approval document also covers Studies 2 and 3 (below). 
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from participating further. Participants were then asked to provide informed consent (see 
Appendix C). As part of what participants were told was ‘Study 1’, participants then completed 
a short demographics questionnaire (see Appendix D) that asked them about their gender, age, 
religious persuasion, level of religious devoutness (along a 7-point scale), how many years they 
have studied at a college or university, what country they currently reside in, and how wealthy 
they consider themselves to be (along a 7-point scale). 
After completing the short survey, participants in the RR condition read the following 
passage of text about the great rewards that God promises in return for pious/moral conduct: 
There are no rewards equal or equivalent to those that God possesses. The 
people who are moral and do good deeds will receive God’s greatest rewards. 
Those who believe in God and do good deeds will spend their afterlives in 
Heaven, and will live there eternally. In Heaven, those righteous people will be 
in constant enjoyment and fulfilment, and will have all that they could ever 
desire, and they will be most thankful. They will never experience any feelings 
of need or disappointment in Heaven. Of all of those who believe in God, the 
honest men and honest women, the patient men and patient women, the modest 
men and modest women, the just men and just women, and the charitable men 
and charitable women, will receive that great and unending reward – an 
eternity in Heaven – for their righteous conduct. This is God’s promise, and 
there is nothing as truthful or as trustworthy as God. 
Participants in the RK condition read the following passage of text referring to God’s kindness 
and forgiveness (adapted from Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016, Study 2): 
God is the Lord of the heavens and the earth and all things between them. There 
is nothing in the universe as powerful, or as merciful, as God. He is both mighty 
and forgiving. Those who go about their lives and consider God in all of the 
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important decisions that they make will receive His favor. They are certainly 
righteous people, and God will grant them mercy. God is happy with them and 
they are happy with Him. But God does not demand absolute perfection. There 
are many people who have done good things and bad things. But if they 
acknowledge their sins, perhaps God will forgive them. Just as God may forgive 
those who do bad things unintentionally or out of ignorance, so long as they 
repent afterwards. And just as God will forgive those who are forced to sin by 
other people. Indeed, God does not blame you for the things you are unfairly 
forced to do. 
Participants in the control condition read the following passage of text about the properties of 
spoken language (adapted from Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016, Study 2): 
A primary feature of language is that it helps people to live as social beings. 
People use language to express their thoughts, feelings, wishes, plans, and so 
on. An individual becomes part of the society by learning its language, and to 
learn that language, an individual must interact with other people in that 
society. Thus, social interaction is essential for language acquisition. It should 
be noted that there are two types of language: internal and external. Internal 
language is the representation of linguistic knowledge in your mind. External 
language is the expression of that knowledge in the form of speech or writing 
when interacting with other individuals. Factors such as the voice, age and sex 
of the speaker play a key role in determining the meaning of linguistic 
expressions. For example, the tone of the voice helps the listener to understand 
whether what he is hearing is a joke or is meant to be serious. 
Additionally, to ensure that participants were truthful when they claimed to be fluent in 
English, participants were asked to describe (in at least 80 characters) what the passage of text 
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they read was about. Participants who gave incoherent responses, or responses that otherwise 
indicated a lack of English-competency or basic effort, were excluded from the study. Asking 
participants to summarise the passage they had read was also expected to enhance the priming 
effect by having them actively engage with the material, when they could otherwise have 
rushed through it without absorbing the themes (e.g., divine reward) of each passage. 
Participants then completed a shortened version of the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988; see Appendix E), as their responses could 
indicate whether the texts in the different conditions elicited particular/discrepant effects on 
participants’ moods. In this task, participants were presented with 20 words relevant to mood. 
Of those words, ten were ‘positive’ (e.g., ‘calm’, ‘happy’) and ten were ‘negative’ (e.g., 
‘irritable’, ‘sad’). Participants were asked to rate how accurately each word described their 
current mood, along a 5-point scale (1 = “not at all”; 5 = “highly”). Participants were also asked 
to briefly describe their current mood. 
Following the PANAS, participants were asked what they thought the purpose of the 
study was. This question was included to further convince participants that the preceding 
questions were part of one study, and that what was to follow was a separate study. After 
responding to this question, participants were told that the ‘first study’ was finished, and that 
they were moving on to ‘Study 2’. 
Dictator Game. Participants then played the Dictator Game. In the Dictator Game, 
each participant is given a specified sum of money, and is asked to split that money between 
himself/herself and a ‘Receiver’. Participants were told that they had been randomly assigned 
to the ‘sender’ group, meaning that they would be deciding how much money to send to the 
anonymous (though actually non-existent) ‘receiver’, whom they were told was supposedly 
completing a separate unpaid task. In this study, participants were allocated $1.00(AUD) to 
split between themselves and the anonymous receiver. Participants were asked to ensure that 
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the amount they nominated fell between $0.00(AUD) and $1.00(AUD), as the nomination of 
an invalid amount would invalidate their data. Participants were also told that the receiver 
would not be told who the sender was, or how much money the sender kept for himself/herself. 
This was done to address the influence of social pressure on generosity. The entire Dictator 
game setup for this study is shown in Appendix F. 
After completing the Dictator Game, participants responded to a suspicion probe 
question, which asked them what they thought the purpose of the research was, to see whether 
any of them had worked out the purpose of the study. Completion of the suspicion probe 
concluded the study. All participants who completed the online study were sent an e-mail which 
explained the true nature and purpose(s) of the study (see Appendix G) and were given the 
opportunity to withdraw participation if the mild deception involved gave them cause for 
concern. 
Analyses and Results 
Statistical Analyses 
To determine whether the independent variables (IVs) of self-reported levels of 
tertiary education (none; less than 1 year; 1 year; 2 years; 3 years; 4 or more years) , wealth (1 
– 7) or religious devoutness (1 – 7) influenced generosity (the dependent variable, as 
measured by how much money participants chose to give away in the Dictator Game), 
Spearman’s Rho correlational analyses were utilised. Spearman’s Rho tests were favoured 
over parametric alternatives because, according to Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality, the data 
in all three experimental conditions violated the assumption of normality (p < .01). 
Mann-Whitney U tests were then conducted to determine whether males and females 
differed in terms of generosity (as measured by how much money participants chose to give 
away in the Dictator Game). Mann-Whitney U tests were used instead of t tests due to the 
non-normality of the data across all conditions. 
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To determine whether there were differences in generosity (as measured by how much 
money participants chose to give away in the Dictator Game) across the three experimental 
groups (RR, RK, and control), a between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was 
conducted. The assumption of homogeneity of variance was met, and although the 
assumption of normality was violated in all conditions, ANOVA tests are generally 
considered to be robust to normality violations when there is a sufficient number (N ≥ 30) of 
participants in each group/cell (Hills, 2011). 
 In their study, Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016, Study 2) removed participants from the 
dataset if they rated the impressiveness of the passage of text they read (along a 7-point scale) 
with a score of 3 or less. In the present study, participants were not only asked to rate how 
‘impressive’ the text was, but also how ‘meaningful’ it was. To ensure that the effect outlined 
above was robust to considerations of the impressiveness and meaningfulness of the text to 
individual participants, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted.9 This non-parametric test was 
used instead of an ANOVA because, after the omission of the data from participants with low 
overall impressiveness-meaningfulness scores, two of the experimental conditions had fewer 
than 30 participants. For this statistical analysis, individual participants’ scores on the 
impressiveness and meaningfulness measures were summed and then divided by 2 to form 
overall impressiveness-meaningfulness scores. 7 participants whose overall scores fell below 
3.5 were excluded from the analysis.  
The final consideration was the results on the PANAS. One participant was removed 
from the PANAS-related analyses because he/she was unable to record responses to the 
PANAS due to a technical error. The scores on the 10 positive affect items (e.g., ‘happy’, 
‘relaxed’) were summed to form each participant’s overall ‘positive affect’ score, and scores 
                                                 
9 It is generally unadvisable to use ANOVA tests when the assumption of normality is violated in a dataset that 
contains less than 30 participants in each cell (Hill, 2010). 
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on the remaining 10 items were summed to form each participant’s overall ‘negative affect’ 
score. To determine whether self-reported levels of positive affect (DV) differed across 
experimental conditions (IVs), a between-subjects ANOVA test was conducted. However, to 
determine whether self-reported levels of negative affect (DV) differed across experimental 
conditions (IVs), a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted because the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated. 
Results 
Levels of self-reported levels of tertiary education did not correlate with generosity 
generally (rs = .07, p = .52), nor within any of the experimental conditions (RR: rs = .21, p = 
.26; RK: rs = .08, p = .66; control: rs = .19, p = .31). Nor did levels of self-reported wealth 
correlate with generosity generally (rs = .02, p = .84), or within any of the experimental 
conditions (RR: rs = .04, p = .82; RK: rs = .02, p = .84; control: rs = .14, p = .45). Nor did 
levels of self-reported religious devoutness correlate with generosity across the entire sample 
(rs = .04, p = .71), or within any of the experimental conditions (RR: rs = .01, p = .94; RK: rs 
= -.13, p = .48; control: rs = .28, p = .13).  
No difference in generosity between males and females was observed across the entire 
sample: U = 867, p = 0.44. Within each experimental condition, males (Mdn = $0.30, 
interquartile range = 0.30) and females (Mdn = $0.50, interquartile range = 0.33) did not 
differ significantly in terms of generosity in the RR condition: U = 107, p = 0.92. Nor did 
males (Mdn = $0.10, interquartile range = 0.30) and females (Mdn = $0.20, interquartile 
range = 0.37) differ significantly in terms of generosity in the RK condition: U = 89.5, p = 
0.39. Nor did males (Mdn = $0.35, interquartile range = 0.33) and females (Mdn = $0.35, 
interquartile range = 0.40) differ significantly in generosity in the control condition: U = 90.5, 
p = 0.86. 
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 37 
 
  
 In the main analysis, a significant main effect of experimental condition on generosity 
was observed: F(2, 88) = 5.46, p < .01. Tukey HSD post-hoc comparisons were utilised to 
determine where the specific differences between the groups lay. Participants in the RR 
condition (M given = $0.35) and the control condition (M given = $0.34) did not differ 
significantly in terms of generosity (p = .99). However, participants in the RK condition (M 
given = $0.18) were significantly less generous than participants in the RR condition (p = 
.01) and participants in the control condition (p = .02). These findings are illustrated in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1. The average amount of money (in Australian cents) given by participants in 
each experimental condition. 
 After excluding the 7 participants who did not find the texts they read impressive or 
meaningful, the Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that the effect of experimental condition on 
generosity was still significant: H(2) = 9.96, p < .01. Post-hoc Mann-Whitney U tests 
revealed that the participants in the RR condition and the control condition still did not differ 
significantly in terms of generosity (U = 375, p = .78), and that participants in the RK 
condition were still significantly less generous than participants in the RR condition (U = 
221, p < .01) and the control condition (U = 241.5, p < .01). 
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No significant differences in self-reported positive affect were observed across the 
experimental conditions: F(2, 86) = 0.93, p = .40. Nor were any significant differences in 
self-reported negative affect observed across the experimental conditions: H(2) = 2.16, p = 
.34. 
Discussion 
Implications for the Supernatural Reward Hypothesis 
 The central hypothesis of this study was that religious participants exposed to a 
reward-related religious prime would be more generous in the Dictator Game, relative to 
participants exposed to a control prime or a prime emphasising divine kindness/mercy. This 
hypothesis was not supported by the data. While participants who read the passage about 
divine rewards gave away more money than participants who read a passage of text about 
divine kindness/mercy, participants in the control condition gave away approximately the 
same amount on average.  
 Prior to this study, only one empirical study exploring the merits of the SRH had been 
conducted (i.e., Harrell, 2012). In that study, subliminal primes were used, while explicit 
primes were utilised in this study. Harrell found that reward-related religious primes did 
positively influence generosity, while the present study found no such effect. The results of 
the present study are also at variance with those obtained by Pichon et al. (2007), who found 
that religious primes with positive content were more effective at increasing prosociality (by 
increasing the accessibility of prosocial concepts in participants’ minds) than general 
religious primes. The reward-related religious passage in this study was positive in nature, 
and yet participants in the religious reward condition were no more prosocial than 
participants in the control condition. The question arises: why did the present study fail to 
demonstrate an effect? 
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Perhaps van Elk et al. (2016) were correct in their assessment about the risk of 
publication bias. It may be the case that other studies exploring the merits of the SRH found 
null results and were simply never published. Van Elk et al. found that the robustness of the 
religious priming effect on prosociality may not be robust after accounting for potential 
publication bias, and the null finding of the present study could be considered a vindication of 
van Elk et al.’s concerns. However, there is another possible reason as to why the present 
study failed to yield the anticipated effect. 
 While the data obtained in Study 1 offer no support for the SRH, it must be noted that 
this study had several weaknesses. Perhaps the most interesting flaw stems from the general 
nature of the priming passage utilised in the religious reward condition. Some Christian 
participants who were excluded from the analyses expressed religious disagreements with the 
passage of text in the religious reward condition. These participants noted that one does not 
gain entry to Heaven – according to Christianity – simply by doing good deeds; rather, one 
must accept and embrace Christ. This interpretation of the Christian doctrine seems to be 
accurate (e.g., see Ephesians 2:8-9; Isaiah 64:6; John 11:25, 14:6; Mark 16:16), and hence, 
the reward-related religious passage used in this study may have been too general and 
theologically problematic to effectively promote prosociality. Given this, perhaps the reward-
related religious prime used in Study 1 failed to elicit an effect because it was not tailored 
specifically to the beliefs of the majority of participants in the study; namely Christians. 
 Such a suggestion is not without warrant. Using a Muslim sample from the United 
Arab Emirates, Aveyard (2014, Study 1) explored whether participants exposed to religious 
prime-words in a sentence unscrambling task (SUT) would conduct themselves more 
honestly in a subsequent mathematical task (relative to participants in the control group), 
within which they had the opportunity to cheat (the “computer glitch paradigm”; see von 
Hippel, Lakin & Shakarchi, 2005). Aveyard found no differences in honesty between the two 
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groups. However, in a second study, Aveyard found that participants who heard the athan (a 
traditional Muslim call to prayer) in the religious priming condition did conduct themselves 
more honestly than control group participants. Aveyard concluded that culturally-sensitive 
primes may be more effective at producing effects than primes that are not designed 
specifically for cultural groups that the participants come from. 
 Duhaime (2015) replicated the findings of Aveyard (2014, Study 2) in a field study 
involving Muslim participants from Morocco. In a marketplace setting, Duhaime offered 
local shopkeepers (and other interested passers-by) the chance to (1) receive 20 Moroccan 
dirhams10 (the local currency) while nothing is given to charity, (2) receive 10 Moroccan 
dirhams and allow 30 Moroccan dirhams to be given to charity, or (3) keep nothing and allow 
60 Moroccan dirhams to be given to charity. In short, the less money participants chose to 
take, the more money the experimenter would donate to charity. Duhaime found that 
participants who responded during (or very shortly after) the public call to prayer (the athan) 
were significantly more generous than participants who responded when the call to prayer 
was inaudible. Duhaime did not compare the effects of this culturally-sensitive prime (i.e., 
the call to prayer) to those of typical Western methods (e.g., prime-words featured in 
sentence unscrambling tasks), but these findings do reinforce Aveyard’s contention about the 
efficacy of primes that are tailored to the communities within which they are used. 
 Given these findings, it may be advisable for researchers exploring the religion-
prosociality link using priming paradigms to use religiously homogenous samples (i.e., 
participants from the same religious tradition and sect) in their studies, and to utilise primes 
that are designed specifically to appeal to people from the selected religious tradition/sect. 
For example, relative to the priming passage used in the religious reward condition in Study 
1, perhaps a passage referring to how believing in Christ and following His example is the 
                                                 
10 1 Moroccan dirham is worth $0.13(AUD), as of October, 2017.  
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 41 
 
  
surest path to Heaven would resonate better with Christian participants, and thereby be more 
effective in producing a prosociality effect in a Christian sample. Indeed, if Aveyard’s (2014) 
conclusion that culturally-sensitive primes are more effective in producing effects is correct, 
then participants exposed to culturally-relevant reward-related religious primes should 
behave more prosocially than participants exposed to generic reward-related religious primes. 
Culturally-relevant primes may be particularly effective in explicit priming studies. 
Subliminal primes bypass conscious awareness and rumination (Jacobs & Sack, 2012), and 
implicit primes do not necessarily provide a narrative for participants to absorb or to critique. 
Indeed, the purpose of using implicit primes is to ensure that participants do not ruminate on 
the content of the prime, as this could lead to them becoming aware of the purpose of the 
study (Shariff et al., 2016). Explicit primes, however, are likely to be the subject of conscious 
contemplation, and thus, there is greater potential for disagreement and defensiveness on the 
part of participants. It is unlikely that negative reactions from participants who object to the 
contents of a particular prime (e.g., on the basis of a theological disagreement) will be 
conducive to prosociality. For this reason, it is important to ensure that specific primes and 
priming paradigms used in studies exploring the religion-prosociality link are designed with 
precision, so that they are relevant to the people who are being exposed to them. 
 This consideration of cultural-relevance forms the rationale of Study 2 (see below). 
However, the results of Study 1 have other noteworthy implications that must be addressed 
before progressing to the next study. 
Divine Rewards and Selfishness 
 While the SRH was not supported by the results obtained in Study 1, the opposite 
hypothesis (i.e., that divine rewards make people behave selfishly) is also unsupported. As 
was previously noted, Shariff and Rhemtulla (2012) found that crime-rates are higher in 
countries wherein belief in Heaven exceeds belief in Hell. Given this, one might conclude 
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that belief in divine rewards leads to increased selfishness, and hence, exposure to reward-
related religious primes might actually decrease prosociality. 
 The data obtained in Study 1 do not support such a contention. Religious participants 
exposed to reward-related religious primes gave away about the same amount of money as 
participants in the control condition and gave away more money than participants in the 
religious kindness condition. While Shariff and Rhemtulla (2012) were investigating links 
between certain kinds of religious belief and anti-social behaviour (i.e., crime), the findings 
of this study challenge any extrapolation of their findings to apply to the relationship between 
certain – in this case, reward-related – religious beliefs and prosociality. While concepts of 
divine benevolence may promote certain kinds of anti-sociality (e.g., an increased tendency 
to cheat during a quiz task; see Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011), the results from Study 1 yielded 
no evidence suggesting that divine reward concepts negatively influence prosociality. 
 The results from Study 1 may offer some insight into the difference between the 
results of Harrell (2012) and Shariff and Rhemtulla (2012). Given that Harrell (2012) utilised 
subliminal reward-related religious primes (thereby bypassing conscious awareness and 
appraisal), it is possible that participants were only influenced by the reward-related elements 
of the primes and were not influenced to think about divine forgiveness or mercifulness. 
Moreover, it may be the case that stronger belief in Heaven correlates positively with belief 
in kind and merciful gods and it is possible that it was the belief in kind and merciful gods 
that underlay the higher crime rates, rather than the expectation of divine rewards. Such a 
conclusion is somewhat speculative, and further research will need to be undertaken to 
explore this possibility. However, the next section will, in part, explore the merits of this 
contention. 
 
 
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 43 
 
  
Divine Mercifulness and Selfishness 
While the main hypothesis (i.e., that reward-related religious primes would increase 
prosociality, relative to alternative primes) was not supported by the results, the data do still 
indicate a complex association between religious belief and prosocial behaviour. The most 
notable finding was that the participants who read the passage about God’s forgiving and 
merciful nature were less generous than participants from the other two groups. As was 
indicated by the lack of differences across experimental groups on the PANAS sub-scales, 
differences in generosity across groups did not appear to be influenced by mood. While this 
finding must be interpreted with caution given the small sample size, other studies have 
demonstrated similar effects (e.g., Card, 2013, Study 2; DeBono et al., 2017; Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2011). 
This result reinforces the findings of Shariff and Norenzayan (2011), who found that 
belief in a kind, forgiving and merciful God correlated positively with cheating (i.e., 
antisocial/immoral) behaviour. Previous priming studies exploring the prosocial effects of 
divine benevolence primes found that people exposed to divine benevolence/forgiveness 
primes express no more willingness to help others than people exposed to control primes 
(Card, 2013, Study 1), cheat more often in quiz tasks than people exposed to control primes 
(Card, 2013, Study 2; also see DeBono et al., 2017, Study 3) and steal more money when the 
opportunity arises than people exposed to control primes (DeBono et al., 2017, Study 2). 
Study 1 adds to this growing literature by demonstrating that religious participants exposed to 
divine benevolence primes are less generous than religious participants exposed to control 
primes when they are given the opportunity to divide money between themselves and 
anonymous others.  
It is also noteworthy that previous studies exploring the effects of divine 
benevolence/forgiveness primes on prosociality (e.g., Card, 2013, Study 2; DeBono et al., 
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2017; Studies 1–3) have generally focused on anti-social behaviour. That is, such studies 
have tended to focus on whether such primes increase/decrease the likelihood of cheating or 
stealing. As DeBono et al. (2017, pg.S8) noted, “[i]t is conceivable that ‘positive’ forms of 
moral behavior, which involve actively doing good, rather than avoiding doing wrong” may 
not be affected in the same way. The findings of Study 1 are significant, as they suggest that 
divine benevolence/forgiveness primes can decrease the likelihood of prosocial behaviours 
(e.g., generosity, in this instance). 
Two previous studies tested the effects of divine benevolence primes on positive 
forms of prosociality (Card, 2013, Study 1; Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016, Study 2). Card 
found that participants primed with benevolent god concepts expressed no more willingness 
to help than control participants, and Yilmaz and Bahçekapili found that participants primed 
with benevolent god concepts did not differ from control group participants on a measure of 
prosocial intentions. In Study 1, participants exposed to benevolent god concepts donated less 
than control group participants. This latter finding suggests that divine 
benevolence/forgiveness concepts may not merely be unideal for the promotion of prosocial 
behaviours (e.g., by being no more effective at promoting prosociality than control primes 
are), but such concepts may even be counterproductive in certain instances. 
Collectively, the results outlined above suggest that those who believe in a god who 
forgives people who behave selfishly and/or immorally may feel far less compelled to behave 
prosocially. If the gods will forgive us for our mistakes and transgressions, the question arises 
as to whether or not behaving prosocially is worthwhile at all. Perhaps the belief that one will 
be forgiven for his/her transgressions makes many religious people feel free to transgress 
again (DeBono et al., 2017). 
 While such an account does make sense of the data obtained, consideration of the 
issue of cultural-sensitivity noted in the previous section gives rise to an obvious question: if 
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the primes used in Study 1 were not tailored to any particular religious group (e.g., contained 
no references to exclusively Christian supernatural agents, such as Jesus), then why were 
participants in the religious kindness condition significantly less generous than participants in 
the other conditions? Why did the culturally-non-specific priming passage in the religious 
kindness condition elicit an effect, while the culturally-non-specific priming passage in the 
religious reward condition failed to do so? 
 While the lack of cultural sensitivity may have been true of the priming passage 
utilised in the religious reward condition, it is unlikely that the religious kindness passage 
was equally problematic. The concept of divine forgiveness for one’s imperfections and 
transgressions is a major theme in Christianity (see 1 John 1:9; Acts 3:19; Ephesians 4:31-32; 
Matthew 6:12-14), and the vast majority of participants in Study 1 were Christians. Hence, 
although the passage was not deliberately addressed to Christian participants, the core theme 
of the passage was consistent with Christian doctrine. In the case of the religious reward 
passage, one could object – as some participants did – that the passage did not accurately 
represent the Christian view of how people reach Heaven. 
  Ultimately, the findings of Study 1 contribute further evidence that notions of divine 
forgiveness and mercy are unconducive to prosocial behaviour. This particular finding also 
contributes further evidence in support of the notion that conceptually-distinct primes (e.g., 
divine reward primes vs. divine kindness primes) can elicit distinct effects on prosociality 
(Preston & Ritter, 2013; Saleam & Moustafa, 2016). However, this study was not without its 
shortcomings, which are addressed in the following section. 
Limitations 
 It is worth noting that Study 1 featured a small sample size, and so any conclusions 
based on the data obtained must be interpreted with caution. Van Elk et al. (2016) noted that 
one significant issue in the religious priming literature has been the utilisation of small 
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samples in empirical studies. This issue is particularly noteworthy given that recent meta-
analyses have demonstrated a negative correlation between effect size and sample size in the 
religious priming literature (van Elk et al., 2016; also see Shariff et al., 2016). That is, 
religious priming studies with larger sample sizes tend to show smaller differences across 
experimental groups. This is concerning because studies with larger sample sizes generally 
produce much more reliable results (van Elk et al., 2016). 
 It is also noteworthy that in Harrell’s (2012) study, the amount of money available to 
participants in the Dictator Game was $8.00(USD), whereas in the present study, only 
$1.00(AUD) was offered to each participant. This difference may could be important for 
several reasons. For example, the smaller amount of available money necessarily restricts the 
range of responses available to participants. Moreover, participants may not have believed 
that such a small quantity of money was worth dividing (e.g., a 50% split would mean that 
each person only receives $0.50, when perhaps it would be better, at least perceivably, for 
one person to receive all the money). These are worthy considerations; however, previous 
research has found that the amount of money offered to participants from the United States in 
the Dictator Game (e.g., $1.00, $5.00 or $10.00) appears to have little effect on the 
percentage of money they decide to give away (Raihani, Mace & Lamba, 2013). 
Furthermore, this smaller amount of available money did not prevent a difference in 
generosity between participants in the religious kindness and other conditions from being 
observed. 
This study also used a highly subjective measure of personal religiosity. Participants 
in this study were simply asked how religiously devout they considered themselves to be. 
Although religious devoutness was uncorrelated with generosity, a more objective measure of 
participants’ levels of religious devoutness (e.g., the Centrality of Religiosity Scale; see 
Huber & Huber, 2012; Huber, 2003) may have been more appropriate. 
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 Another flaw in this study’s research design was the lack of secular priming 
conditions. Harrell’s (2012) study not only included a religious reward priming condition, but 
also a secular reward priming condition, wherein participants were exposed to primes that 
had reward connotations that were not religious in nature (e.g., ‘applause’, ‘appreciate’).  The 
inclusion of a secular reward condition and a secular kindness condition could have 
facilitated a clearer understanding of whether religious participants are influenced more by 
exposure to religious primes or secular primes. Moreover, if participants exposed to particular 
religious primes (e.g., reward-related religious primes) are more or less generous than 
participants exposed to equivalent secular primes (e.g., reward-related secular primes), this 
might also suggest that the common element between the two conditions (e.g., the reward 
element) does not underlie the differences between the groups. Given these considerations, 
the inclusion of equivalent secular priming conditions is advised to future researchers in the 
field. 
It should also be noted that this study only featured participants from Western nations, 
and the vast majority of participants identified as Christians; hence, the findings may not 
generalise to non-Western cultures or to people from other faiths. Divine rewards feature 
prominently in other religious traditions (e.g., Islam; see Saleam & Moustafa, 2016), and 
perhaps the salience of reward concepts differs across religious traditions, meaning that some 
religious groups may be more responsive to reward-related religious primes than others. A 
larger study featuring sufficient numbers of participants from a variety of religious groups 
could test such a hypothesis. 
 Lastly, as was previously noted, one possible shortcoming of this study was the 
generic nature of the priming passage in the religious reward condition. Perhaps a more 
culturally-sensitive priming passage would have produced an effect. This hypothesis is tested 
in the following empirical study.  
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Study 2  
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Method 
Participants 
Data from the 31 religious reward (RR) group participants from Study 1 (11 males; 20 
females) were retained for Study 2. Additional participants were recruited via MTurk until 
each of the two conditions in this study – the religious reward condition, and the new 
‘Christian reward’ condition (CR) – had usable data from ~45 participants, after accounting 
for those to be excluded from the analysis (e.g., participants who expressed knowledge of the 
study’s aims in response to the suspicion probe question). Prospective participants first 
responded to a short survey asking what religion they subscribe to, what country they reside 
in, and how deeply religious they consider themselves to be. Those who identified as 
Christians (e.g., Baptists, Catholics, Lutherans, etc.), and who gave a score of 4 or higher 
along the 7-point religiosity scale were eligible to participate in the study. Participation was 
restricted to Western countries. 
Prior to exclusions, 83 additional participants (25 males; 58 females) were recruited to 
participate in this study. Of these initial 83 participants, a total of 19 participants were 
excluded from the study. 16 participants were excluded from the analysis because their 
responses on the suspicion probe questions indicated fairly accurate knowledge as to what the 
purpose of the study was. One participant was removed from the analysis because he/she 
expressed a great deal of annoyance toward the survey rules and noted that he/she was 
experiencing personal problems, and these factors may have influenced his/her decision in 
the Dictator Game. One participant was removed from the study because he/she expressed 
theological disagreement with the content of the priming passage in the CR condition (i.e., 
that good deeds and divine rewards are completely unlinked in Christian doctrine), which 
may have influenced his/her response in the Dictator Game. Lastly, one participant was 
excluded because he/she attempted the study twice. These exclusions resulted in a final 
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sample of 91 participants (29 males; 62 females). Most of the participants were Christians (N 
= 90),11 while the sample also included 1 Jewish participant. 
All participants recruited for Study 2 – excluding the participant who re-attempted the 
study – were paid $1.03(USD) for their participation, in addition to however much money 
they decided to keep in the Dictator Game (see below). Participants from Study 1 whose data 
were retained for Study 2 were not paid any additional money. 
Procedure 
 The methodology for Study 2 was identical to that of Study 1. The only novel element 
of this study was the introduction of a new religious priming condition: the Christian reward 
(CR) condition. All new participants were randomly assigned to either the religious reward 
(RR) condition or the Christian reward (CR) condition. 
While new participants in the RR condition read the same passage of text as RR 
participants from Study 1, participants in the new CR condition read the following passage of 
text about how belief in Christ and following Christ’s moral example would ensure that they 
reach Heaven in the afterlife: 
Jesus Christ is our Lord and Savior, and is the son of God. It is only through 
Christ that we can reach Heaven in the afterlife. If we believe in Christ and 
follow His example, we are assured that we will spend eternity with Him in 
Heaven. Good deeds alone, without belief, are insufficient. But the believers 
who help the needy (if they can), the believers who are generous, the believers 
who pray even for their foes, the believers who are honest, and the believers 
who avoid immorality, will all find their way to Heaven. And there is no reward 
in existence that in any way compares to life in Heaven; wherein all pain and 
wounds will be healed, and there will be no unhappiness or hatred. There will 
                                                 
11 Two of the Christian participants identified as Mormons. 
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only be eternal happiness, love, and peace with our Lord, which is what He 
intended for us from the beginning, so long as we were willing to abide in Him, 
to embrace Him, and to adhere to His guidance and teachings. And our Lord 
never fails to fulfil what He promises. While we may need to endure discomfort 
and grief at times, what awaits us in the afterlife will surely make our 
perseverance and sacrifices seem well worthwhile. 
Apart from these minor differences, all other elements of the methodology of Study 2 
were identical to those of Study 1 (e.g., completion of the demographics survey and the adapted 
PANAS, and participation in the Dictator Game). 
Analyses and Results 
Statistical Analyses 
To determine whether the independent variables (IVs) of self-reported levels of 
tertiary education (none; less than 1 year; 1 year; 2 years; 3 years; 4 or more years), wealth (1 
– 7) or religious devoutness (1 – 7) influenced generosity (the dependent variable, as 
measured by how much money participants chose to give away in the Dictator Game), 
Spearman’s Rho correlational analyses were utilised. Spearman’s Rho tests were favoured 
over parametric alternatives because, according to Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality, the data 
in both experimental conditions violated the assumption of normality (p < .01). 
A Mann-Whitney U test was then conducted to determine whether males and females 
differed in terms of generosity (as measured by how much money participants chose to give 
away in the Dictator Game). This non-parametric test was used instead of a t test due to the 
non-normality of the data across the two experimental conditions. 
Another Mann-Whitney U test was then conducted to determine whether there were 
differences in generosity (as measured by how much money participants chose to give away 
in the Dictator Game) between the experimental groups (RR and CR). Again, the non-
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parametric test was used due to the non-normality of the data in both experimental 
conditions. Additionally, as was done in Study 1, all individual participants’ scores on the 
impressiveness and meaningfulness measures were summed and then divided by 2 to form 
overall impressiveness-meaningfulness scores. 7 participants whose overall scores fell below 
3.5 were excluded from the analysis. After these exclusions, the data were re-analysed using 
a Mann-Whitney U test. 
Lastly, to determine whether there were any differences in positive and/or negative 
affect (as measured by the positive and negative affect subscales of the PANAS) between the 
two experimental groups, two Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted. The scores on the 10 
positive-word (e.g., ‘happy’, ‘proud’) items were summed to form each participant’s overall 
‘positive affect’ score, and scores on the 10 negative-word items (e.g., ‘loathing’, ‘sad’) were 
summed to form an overall ‘negative affect’ score. Two participants were excluded from 
these analyses because they failed to complete some of the individual items on the PANAS, 
making it impossible to compute accurate subscale scores. Another participant was removed 
from the analysis because his/her scores on the negative PANAS subscale were completely at 
odds with how the participant described his/her overall mood (his/her negative affect score 
was very high, but the participant’s description of his/her mood was very positive), and so it 
appears that the PANAS was not seriously attempted by the participant. For the negative 
subscale of the PANAS, two outliers were detected in the CR condition with comparatively 
high negative affect scores. The outlying scores were reduced to one unit higher than the 
highest non-outlying score, as per the recommendations Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). 
Results 
Self-reported levels of tertiary education did not correlate with generosity generally 
(rs = .05, p = .65), nor within either of the experimental conditions (RR: rs = .13, p = .38; CR: 
rs = .07, p = .67). Nor did levels of self-reported wealth correlate with generosity generally (rs 
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= .01, p = .92), or within either of the experimental conditions (RR: rs = .01, p = .96; CR: rs = 
.01, p = .96). Nor did levels of self-reported religious devoutness correlate with generosity 
across the entire sample (rs = .06, p = .55), or within either of the experimental conditions 
(RR: rs = .07, p = .63; CR: rs = .11, p = .46). 
No difference in generosity between males and females was observed across the entire 
sample: U = 880, p = 0.86. Within each experimental condition, males (Mdn = $0.40, 
interquartile range = 0.29) and females (Mdn = $0.25, interquartile range = 0.30) did not 
differ significantly in terms of generosity in the RR condition: U = 215, p = 0.67. Nor did 
males (Mdn = $0.25, interquartile range = 0.33) and females (Mdn = $0.50, interquartile 
range = 0.25) differ significantly in terms of generosity in the CR condition: U = 193.5, p = 
0.59. 
 In the main analysis, no significant differences in generosity were observed between 
the RR group (M = $0.33, Mdn = $0.30, interquartile range = 0.28) and the CR group (M = 
$0.38, Mdn = $0.50, interquartile range = 0.25): U = 898, p = 0.25. These findings are 
illustrated in Figure 2 (below). The small (non-significant) difference between the two groups 
decreased when the 11 participants who gave low impressiveness-meaningfulness scores (less 
than 3.5) were removed from the dataset (RR: M = $0.36, Mdn = $0.50, interquartile range = 
0.25; CR: M = $0.38, Mdn = $0.50, interquartile range = 0.25): U = 751, p = 0.64. Even after 
the exclusion of the two Mormon participants and the 1 Jewish participant, the difference 
remained non-significant: U = 704, p = 0.73.12 
                                                 
12 In this analysis, participants with low impressiveness-meaningfulness scores were also excluded, in addition 
to the exclusion of the strictly non-Christian participants. 
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Figure 2. The average amount of money (in Australian cents) given by participants in 
the RR and CR conditions. 
No significant difference in self-reported positive affect was observed between the 
RR group (M = 33.18, Mdn = 34, interquartile range = 14) and the CR group (M = 36.53, 
Mdn = 37, interquartile range = 16): U = 765.5, p = 0.13. Nor was any significant difference 
in self-reported negative affect observed between the RR group (M = 15.49, Mdn = 11, 
interquartile range = 8) and the CR group (M = 12.14, Mdn = 10, interquartile range = 4): U = 
804.5, p = 0.14. 
Discussion 
Implications for the Supernatural Reward Hypothesis  
The main hypothesis for Study 2 was that Christian participants exposed to a reward-
related religious prime tailored specifically to their religious tradition (i.e., Christianity) 
would behave more generously than Christian participants (and religious participants in 
general) who were exposed to a more generic reward-related religious prime. The data from 
Study 2 offered no support for this hypothesis. Moreover, given that participants in the 
religious reward condition in Study 2 were approximately equally generous relative to control 
group participants from Study 1, the findings of Study 2 suggest that even culturally-sensitive 
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reward-related religious primes are no more effective at promoting prosociality than control 
primes. This finding poses a significant challenge to the supernatural reward hypothesis 
(SRH). 
The results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that the conscious contemplation of reward-
related religious concepts does not markedly increase generosity in anonymous settings. 
Despite the many reasons outlined in previous sections for believing that the reward-related 
concepts in religion can promote prosociality, the results obtained in Studies 1 and 2 do not 
support this claim. This null finding is peculiar, given that Harrell’s (2012) subliminal 
priming study did demonstrate such an effect. The subliminal priming study conducted by 
Pichon et al. (2007), which contained several reward-related religious primes (among other 
religious primes that had positive connotations), also found a positive effect on prosociality. 
Hence, the current divide appears to be between studies using explicit priming paradigms 
(i.e., Study 1 and Study 2; see above) and studies using subliminal priming techniques. 
One possible explanation for the findings is that the positive results found by Harrell 
(2012) occurred by chance. Perhaps reward-related religious primes are actually ineffective at 
increasing generosity. Explicit primes should produce more pronounced effects because there 
is a greater capacity for priming participants with more complex and detailed concepts 
(Shariff et al., 2016). Hence, if the SRH is correct, and if a subliminal priming study (i.e., 
Harrell, 2012) yielded evidence clearly supportive of the SRH, then one would expect that an 
explicit priming study would also detect a prosocial effect of reward-related religious primes. 
Studies 1 and 2 yielded no such evidence; hence, there is strong reason to doubt the veracity 
of the SRH. However, there are alternative explanations for the data obtained in Studies 1 and 
2 that are worth exploring. 
It is possible that the explicit reward-related religious primes used in Studies 1 and 2 
not only primed participants with divine reward concepts, but also led to thoughts of divine 
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benevolence and forgiveness. That is, participants may have interpreted God’s rewarding 
nature – as indicated in the priming passages – as being indicative of a generally 
benevolent/forgiving nature. Given that divine benevolence/forgiveness primes have 
regularly been found to have negative effects on prosociality (e.g., see Study 1 above; also 
see Card, 2013; DeBono et al., 2017; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011), any thoughts of divine 
benevolence/forgiveness resulting from the reading of explicit reward-related religious 
passages may have diluted any potential prosocial effects that the reward-element(s) of the 
primes may have elicited. As was noted earlier, while divine rewards do constitute a kind of 
divine benevolence, a rewarding supernatural agent is not necessarily a benevolent one (e.g., 
the Qur’an notes that God will reward good people, but also that He will harshly punish 
wrongdoers). Perhaps future explicit priming research could disentangle concepts of divine 
benevolence and divine reward to better isolate the prosocial effects of the reward-related 
elements of religion. 
Another possible explanation for the difference in results across priming techniques 
(explicit vs. subliminal) may be that the participants who read the reward-related religious 
passages consciously suppressed the effects of the primes. That is, participants may have 
noticed that the content of the passage was affecting their judgement in the Dictator Game 
(e.g., by making them think about the rewards they may receive for being generous), and they 
may have actively tried to behave impartially. Perhaps participants tried to override their own 
perceived selfishness. Many participants were excluded from the analyses because they 
understood the significance and purpose of the priming passage, but perhaps many other 
participants realised that the passage was influencing their judgement without realising that 
this was the purpose of the study. If participants were correcting their responses in an attempt 
to be more impartial and less selfish, this could account for why the results from Studies 1 
and 2 differ from those obtained in subliminal priming studies. 
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While the possible explanations outlined above may explain the inconsistent findings, 
one other noteworthy difference between Harrell’s (2012) subliminal priming study and 
Studies 1 and 2 is that Harrell’s study was conducted in a laboratory setting, whereas Studies 
1 and 2 were conducted entirely online. It is possible that the MTurk samples utilised were 
not equivalent to regular samples; however, research suggests that MTurk samples do yield 
reliable data, relative to samples drawn by more traditional methods (Buhrmester et al., 2011; 
Simons & Chabris, 2012). Furthermore, in the religion-prosociality literature, studies using 
MTurk samples have produced results identical to those produced by lab-based samples 
(Shariff et al., 2016). Hence, it seems unlikely that the difference in experimental setting 
underlies the differences in priming effectiveness. 
Limitations 
 Study 2 suffered from many of the same limitations as Study 1 (e.g., small sample 
size). While the prime in the Christian reward condition was tailored more precisely to 
Christian beliefs, one of the participants expressed the same theological disagreement with 
the content of the prime that some participants expressed about the reward-related religious 
prime in Study 1. That is, divine rewards are not promised to people who behave morally, but 
rather, are promised to those who repent for their sins, and accept Jesus Christ as their Lord 
and Saviour. While the passage in the Christian reward condition explicitly appealed to 
Christian doctrine, some participants may have felt as though the passage did not reflect their 
beliefs about divine rewards. Hence, it is possible that the null finding is, in part, a reflection 
of the fact that, according to Christianity, moral behaviour is neither a sufficient nor 
necessary condition for gaining entry to Heaven. 
Additionally, Study 2 featured a sample of Western Christians, and the null findings 
from this study may not generalise to samples drawn from non-Western and/or non-Christian 
cultures. As DeBono et al. (2017) noted, the gods of different religious traditions often have 
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markedly different attributes, and consequently, those religions will likely differ in terms of 
their effects/influences on behaviour. While Christians may not be influenced to behave more 
generously by reward-related religious primes, perhaps Muslims or Hindus might be. Future 
studies should be conducted to determine whether there are differences across religious 
traditions in terms of how reward-related religious primes influence prosociality. 
But while it is well arguable that morality and divine rewards are unlinked in 
Christian doctrine, it is not known how many Christians are aware of this possibility. Perhaps 
the layman’s interpretation of Christian doctrine is that ‘good things happen to good people’.  
Indeed, in a study featuring 1,456 practising Christians, the Barna Group (2017) found that 
about 32% of practising Christians believe this karmic notion. More research should be 
devoted to exploring whether most Christians believe that morality and entry to Heaven are 
linked or unlinked. The findings of such research would have important implications for how 
the findings of Studies 1 and 2 should be interpreted. Notably, if the majority of Christians do 
not believe that moral behaviour is necessary when it comes to gaining entry to Heaven, then 
this could explain why the explicit priming of reward-related religious concepts was 
ineffective at increasing the generosity of Christian participants.  
 Importantly, as was a noted weakness of Study 1, it is still possible that the reward-
related religious passages in Study 2 promoted thoughts of divine benevolence in addition to 
any thoughts about contingent divine rewards. Given that research has found that the priming 
of divine benevolence/mercifulness concepts is ineffective and/or counterproductive when it 
comes to promoting prosociality (see Card, 2013; DeBono et al., 2017; Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2011; also see Study 1 above), the accidental priming of such concepts may 
weaken any prosocial effects that the divine reward concepts elicited. 
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Implicit Priming of Divine Reward Concepts 
 I mentioned above that there are many types of priming techniques. Thus far, the SRH 
has been tested using an explicit priming paradigm (Studies 1 and 2; see above) and a 
subliminal priming paradigm (Harrell, 2012). The SRH has not yet been tested using any 
typical implicit priming paradigm (e.g., the sentence unscrambling task). 
 As was noted above, there are reasons as to why the explicit priming of reward-
related religious concepts may not be effective at increasing prosociality. Given that Harrell 
(2012) found that reward-related religious primes that bypass conscious awareness can 
increase generosity, perhaps reward-related religious primes that do not necessarily bypass 
conscious awareness, but which are nevertheless not made particularly salient to religious 
participants, will also be effective at increasing generosity. Importantly, because implicit 
primes are less salient than explicit primes, they are not expected to be as heavily subjected to 
rumination by participants, and this lack of rumination may reduce the possibility of 
participants thinking about the relationship between divine rewards and divine benevolence. 
Furthermore, the simplistic nature of implicit primes (e.g., simple words or sounds) may 
better isolate the specific concepts that are intended to be primed in participants, which may 
further reduce the possibility of conceptual overlap (i.e., between concepts of divine 
forgiveness and divine reward) and its potential effects. 
 Study 3 (see below) explored whether the implicit priming of divine reward concepts 
is sufficient to increase the generosity of Christian participants. The hypothesis was that 
Christian participants presented with reward-related religious prime-words (e.g., ‘Heaven’) 
would be more willing to donate money to charity in a subsequent task than Christian 
participants exposed to control primes or neutral religious primes (e.g., ‘church’). A 
secondary hypothesis was that Christian participants exposed to reward-related secular prime-
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words (e.g., ‘rewarded’) would donate about as much money as Christian participants 
exposed to reward-related religious prime-words. 
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Study 3  
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Method 
Participants 
All participants for this study were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
system. Prospective participants first responded to a short survey asking what religion they 
subscribe to, what country they reside in, and how deeply religious they consider themselves 
to be. Those who identified as being Christian, and who gave a score of 4 or higher along the 
7-point religiosity scale, were eligible to participate in the study. Participation was restricted 
to Western nations, and only participants whom had not participated in Studies 1 or 2 were 
eligible for this study. 
This resulted in the recruitment of a total of 135 participants (33 males; 102 females). 
Of these 135 participants, a total of 14 participants were excluded from the study. 6 
participants were excluded from the analysis on the basis that they expressed – in response to 
the suspicion probe – fairly accurate knowledge as to what the purpose of the study was, and 
such knowledge may have influenced giving behaviour. 1 participant was excluded from the 
analysis because his/her responses reflected a conspicuous lack of effort (e.g., were 
incoherent, and did not address the questions asked). Another participant was excluded 
because he/she failed to respond to all questions in the study (of note, the participant did not 
specify which religion he/she subscribes to). A further 2 participants were excluded because 
their raw scores on the Centrality of Religiosity Scale (CRS) fell below 25, and 4 other 
participants were excluded because they identified as being non-religious on the CRS 
measure (e.g., referring to themselves as non-religious and/or “spiritual”), despite having 
CRS scores in excess of 25. These exclusions resulted in a final sample of 121 participants 
(28 males; 93 females). 
All participants were paid $0.50(USD) for their participation, in addition to however 
much money they decided to keep in the Charity Task (see below). 
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Procedure 
This study was conducted entirely online. Studies 1 and 2 were modelled on the 
methodology utilised by Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016, Study 2), which involved the use of 
explicit primes (i.e., passages of religious text). In this study, however, an implicit priming 
paradigm – the ‘sentence unscrambling task’ (SUT) – was utilised. 
Priming phase. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental 
conditions: religious reward (RR), religious neutral (RN), secular reward (SR) or the secular 
neutral (SN).13 Participants first read the study information and informed consent form (see 
Appendix H), which informed them that they were participating in two separate studies (as 
with Studies 1 and 2, this was mild deception). The ‘first study’ was supposedly testing how 
reflection on one’s own religious beliefs affects their mood, and whether this influence on 
mood leads to improved or impaired performance on a simple cognitive task. The ‘second 
study’ was supposedly testing how much money people are willing to donate to anonymous 
charities. Participants were informed that they had a maximum of 60 minutes to complete 
‘both’ studies. Participants were then asked whether they consider themselves to be fluent in 
English. Those who answered ‘No’ were excluded from participating further. Following this, 
participants were asked to provide informed consent. 
Participants then completed the Centrality of Religiosity Scale: Version 10 (CRS-10; 
see Appendix I).14 The CRS-10 measures the nature of people’s religious beliefs, and how 
important and salient those beliefs are to their lives (Huber & Huber, 2012). For the purposes 
of this study, three questions were added to the CRS-10, asking participants how wealthy they 
consider themselves to be (along a 7-point scale), what country they reside in, and how many 
years they have studied at a college or university. 
                                                 
13 The secular neutral (SN) condition is essentially a control condition, as the primes utilised in this condition 
are not specific to any topic/theme in particular. 
14 Permission to use the CRS-10 was granted by the scale’s creator, Professor Stefan Huber of the University of 
Berne in Switzerland. 
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After completing the CRS-10, participants then moved on to the SUT (see Appendix 
J). In this task, participants in each condition were presented with a series of 12 nonsensical 5-
word strings (e.g., don’t, please, heaven, that, do; library, quiet, digit, the, is), with each series 
of 5 words appearing on a separate page. Participants were instructed to construct coherent 4-
word sentences by rearranging the words and removing one word in each string that does not 
appear to fit. For example, in the two examples provided above in parentheses, the words 
‘heaven’ and ‘digit’ could be removed to form the sentences: “Please don’t do that” and “The 
library is quiet”. Before beginning the SUT, participants were provided with two example 
strings (with solutions), to ensure that they understood how to complete the task. 
In the RR, RN and SR conditions, 4 of the 12 word-strings presented to participants 
were distractor items, which did not contain prime-words. Because the SN condition is 
essentially a control condition, all of the word-strings in the SN condition should be considered 
distractors with no significant content. The distractor items in the RR, RN and SR conditions  
were included to conceal the significance of the prime-words. The remaining 8 strings in these 
experimental conditions contained a single prime-word, with two relevant prime-words from 
each condition being used twice (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Prime words used in the RR, RN and SR conditions. 
Condition Prime-Phrases Words Used Twice 
RR afterlife, eternal life, heaven, miracle, salvation, saved heaven, salvation 
RN church, faith, God, prayer, spiritual, temple  faith, God 
SR applause, appreciated, awards, bounty, fame, rewarded awards, rewarded 
 
Because Studies 1 and 2 utilised explicit primes, the inclusion of manipulation check 
items was unnecessary. However, to ensure the effectiveness of the implicit primes used in this 
study, manipulation checks were used. After completing the SUT, participants in the RR 
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condition were asked to select one of seven words that best described the religious theme in 
the sentences they constructed: God’s anger, God’s apathy, God’s leniency, God’s 
mercifulness, God’s punishments, God’s rewards, or God’s vengefulness. If the implicit 
reward-related religious primes are effective, then participants in the RR condition would be 
expected to select the ‘God’s rewards’ option from the list. Similarly, participants in the RN 
condition were simply asked to select one of seven words that they thought best described the 
nature of God: angry, apathetic, lenient, merciful, punishing, rewarding, or vengeful. 
To avoid the unintended priming of participants in the SR and SN conditions with 
religious concepts, participants in these conditions were asked to select one of seven words that 
best describes the nature of government: angry, apathetic, lenient, merciful, punishing, 
rewarding, or vengeful. 
After completing the manipulation check item, participants then completed a shortened 
version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). However, 
the shortened PANAS utilised in this study (see Appendix K) only contained 5 positive affect 
items (attentive, calm, enthusiastic, happy, proud) and 5 negative affect items (angry, 
depressed, guilty, irritable, sad); whereas the shortened PANAS utilised in Studies 1 and 2 
contained 10 items for each affect subscale. As with Studies 1 and 2, this shortened PANAS 
was utilised, in part, to determine whether different kinds of primes were eliciting different 
effects on participants’ moods. Secondarily, the shortened PANAS was utilised as a distraction, 
to reduce the likelihood that participants would realise that the purpose of the study was to 
assess whether the content of the SUT influenced their generosity in the subsequent Dictator 
Game task. 
Following the completion of the shortened PANAS, participants were asked what they 
thought the purpose of the ‘first study’ was. This question was included as a kind of deception. 
Including this question would make it appear as though two separate studies were actually 
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being conducted, and that they had just completed the first study, when in fact, what followed 
(i.e., the charity task; see below) was a separate element of the same study. If a suspicion probe 
question only followed the ‘second study’, there may have been a greater risk of participants 
realising that they were simply completing two elements of the same study. 
After responding to this deceptive suspicion probe question, participants progressed to 
what they were told was a second supposedly ‘separate’ study. 
Charity task. Participants in Studies 1 and 2 played the Dictator Game, wherein the 
supposed recipient of any money given by participants is an anonymous person. In this study, 
participants were allocated $1.00(AUD) to split between themselves and an unspecified charity 
chosen by the researcher (see Appendix L). As with Studies 1 and 2, this was deception, as 
there was no charity group to which any money not taken by the participant would be sent.  
Some participants in Studies 1 and 2 may have been sceptical as to the existence of the 
anonymous receiver in the Dictator Game, and so the scenario may seem more plausible if the 
anonymous receiver is replaced with an anonymous charity. 
After completing the charity task, participants responded to a suspicion probe question, 
asking them what they thought the purpose of the study was. Completion of the suspicion probe 
concluded the study. As with Studies 1 and 2, all participants who completed this study were 
sent an e-mail which explained the true nature and purpose(s) of the study and clarified the 
deception regarding the charity task (see Appendix M). Participants were informed that they 
could withdraw their participation if the deception involved caused them any discomfort. 
Analyses and Results 
Statistical Analyses 
To determine how deeply religious individual participants were, their scores on each 
item of the CRS-10 were summed to create overall CRS-10 scores. Typically, overall CRS 
scores are divided by the number of CRS items (see Huber & Huber, 2012) for the purpose of 
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categorising participants in terms of the extent to which religion (e.g., as ‘not religious’ or 
‘highly religious’). In this study, summed CRS-10 scores were used as a discrete measure of 
religiosity. To assess whether participants’ religious devoutness (as measured by participants’ 
CRS-10 scores) influenced their generosity (the DV, as measured by how much money 
participants chose to donate in the charity task), a series of Spearman’s Rho correlational 
analyses were utilised (within each condition and for the entire sample). The Spearman’s Rho 
test was utilised because, according to Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality, the assumption of 
normality was violated in all conditions (p < .01). A between-subjects ANOVA test was also 
conducted to determine whether average CRS scores differed across the experimental 
conditions. 
A series of Spearman’s Rho correlational analyses were then utilised (within each of 
the 4 experimental conditions, and for the entire sample) to determine whether self-reported 
levels of tertiary education level (none; less than 1 year; 1 year; 2 years; 3 years; 4 or more 
years) or wealth (1 – 7) were related to generosity in the Dictator Game. Spearman’s Rho 
tests were utilised due to the violation of the normality assumption. 
A series of Mann-Whitney U tests were then conducted (within each condition and for 
the entire sample) to assess whether males and females differed in terms of generosity in the 
Dictator Game. Mann-Whitney U tests were used instead of t tests due to the non-normality 
of the data across all conditions. 
To determine whether there were differences in generosity across the four 
experimental groups (RR, RN, SR and SN), after controlling for the effects of personal levels 
of religious devotion (as measured by scores on the CRS, which correlated with generosity in 
the RR and RN conditions; see next section), a between-subjects ANCOVA was utilised. 
While Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality revealed that the normality assumption had been 
violated in all of the experimental conditions (p < .01), ANOVA tests are generally 
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considered to be robust to normality violations when there are more than 30 participants in 
each experimental condition (Hills, 2011). The assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
met, but the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes was violated. In cases where the 
homogeneity of regression slopes assumption is violated, Green and Salkind (2016) 
recommended that the effects of the IV on the DV be measured at different levels of the 
covariate (CV), but due to the low sample size in this study, this was not feasible. The 
interaction between the IV and the CV is not necessarily problematic in this instance, as it 
stands to reason that the effectiveness of general religious primes will correlate positively 
with religious devoutness (as was observed in the RN condition), and there are plausible 
explanations as to why the effectiveness of reward-related religious primes may negatively 
correlate with religious devoutness in Christian samples15 (as was observed in the RR 
condition; see Discussion below). Nevertheless, this interaction should be considered when 
interpreting the results. 
For the RR condition, an additional Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to determine 
whether there were differences in generosity between participants who thought the religious 
theme in the SUT was focused on ‘God’s rewards’ or ‘God’s mercifulness’. This additional 
test was conducted because differences in how the reward-related religious prime was 
interpreted may have had contrastive influences on generosity. Equivalent tests did not need 
to be conducted for the RN (most participants responded that God’s nature was ‘merciful’) or 
SR (most participants responded that the theme of the SUT was ‘society’s rewards’) 
conditions because responses to the manipulation check question in these conditions were 
fairly uniform. Because responses to the manipulation check item in the control condition 
                                                 
15 One such reason was discussed above, and this was the fact that morality and divine rewards are not clearly 
linked in Christian doctrine. I revisit this issue in the Discussion section below. 
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varied greatly, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine whether differences in these 
responses were related to differences in generosity. 
Because the initial ANCOVA test did not differentiate between participants in the RR 
condition who interpreted the theme of the SUT as being related to God’s rewards and those 
who interpreted the theme as being related to God’s mercifulness, a Kruskal-Wallis analysis 
was conducted with the RR group divided into two groups, in accordance with how RR group 
participants responded to the manipulation check item. This non-parametric test was utilised 
because division of the RR group resulted in the formation of two experimental groups with 
only 15 participants in each. One participant from the RR condition interpreted the theme of 
the SUT as being related to God’s punishment, and this participant was excluded from this 
analysis. 
To measure participants’ levels of positive affect, scores on the 5 positive affect items 
were summed to form each participants’ overall ‘positive affect’ score. To measure 
participants’ levels of negative affect, scores on the remaining 5 items were summed to form 
an overall ‘negative affect’ score. To determine whether self-reported levels of positive and 
negative affect (DVs) differed across experimental conditions (IVs), two Kruskal-Wallis tests 
were conducted. These non-parametric tests were utilised because missing PANAS responses 
for a participant in the SR condition resulted in that group having less than 30 participants. 
Results 
Scores on the CRS survey did not correlate with generosity across the entire sample 
(rs = .09, p = .39), nor within the SR (rs = .11, p = .56) or (SN: rs = .13, p = .49) conditions; 
however, CRS scores were negatively correlated with generosity in the RR condition (rs = -
0.36, p = .05) and positively correlated with generosity in the RN condition (rs = .41, p = .02). 
Average levels of religiosity did not differ across experimental conditions: F(3, 117) = 1.14, 
p = .34. 
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Self-reported levels of tertiary education did not correlate with generosity generally 
(rs = .05, p = .56), nor within any of the experimental conditions (RR: rs = .27, p = .14; RN: rs 
= .28, p = .13; SR: rs = .25, p = .18; SN: rs = .07, p = .73). Nor did levels of self-reported 
wealth correlate with generosity generally (rs = .03, p = .79), or within any of the 
experimental conditions (RR: rs = .11, p = .56; RN: rs = .16, p = .42; SR: rs = .02, p = .92; 
SN: rs = .04, p = .83). 
No difference in generosity between males and females was observed across the entire 
sample: U = 1158.5, p = 0.37. Males (Mdn = $0.50, interquartile range = 0.75) and females 
(Mdn = $0.50, interquartile range = 0.46) did not differ significantly in terms of generosity in 
the RR condition: U = 55, p = 0.62. Nor did males (Mdn = $0.10, interquartile range = 0.50) 
and females (Mdn = $0.50, interquartile range = 0.50) differ significantly in terms of 
generosity in the RN condition: U = 60, p = 0.13. Nor did males (Mdn = $0.30, interquartile 
range = 0.85) and females (Mdn = $0.25, interquartile range = 0.46) differ significantly in 
terms of generosity in the SR condition: U = 88, p = 1.0. Nor did males (Mdn = $0.16, 
interquartile range = 1.0) and females (Mdn = $0.25, interquartile range = 0.50) differ 
significantly in terms of generosity in the SN condition: U = 67.5, p = 0.82. 
On the manipulation check item, almost all participants in the RN condition rated God 
as being ‘merciful’ (N = 27), and almost all participants in the SR condition responded that 
the theme in the SUT was ‘society’s rewards’ (N = 26). However, responses in the RR 
condition were not as unanimous, with roughly half of the participants (N = 15) responding 
that the theme of the SUT was ‘God’s mercifulness’, and roughly half of the participants (N = 
15) responding that the theme of the SUT was ‘God’s rewards’. Responses as to the nature of 
society in the SN condition were more varied, with the most common responses being 
‘apathetic’ (N = 14) and ‘angry’ (N = 8). 
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After controlling for differences in personal levels of religious devoutness (as gauged 
by participants’ CRS scores), the ANCOVA test revealed no significant differences in 
generosity across the four experimental conditions: F(3, 117) = 1.0, p = .40. Figure 3 (below) 
illustrates these findings. As was noted in the previous section, this ANCOVA test did not 
differentiate between participants in the RR group who interpreted the theme of the SUT task 
as being related to God’s reward or God’s mercifulness. However, RR group participants 
who interpreted the primes as being reward-based gave significantly more money to charity 
(M = $0.59, Mdn = $0.50, interquartile range = 0.50) than RR group participants who 
interpreted the primes as being mercy-based (M = $0.31, Mdn = $0.25, interquartile range = 
0.50): U = 59.5, p = 0.03. 
 
Figure 3. The average amount of money (in Australian cents) given by participants in 
each experimental condition (RR = religious reward; RN = religious neutral; SR = 
secular reward; SN = secular neutral). 
 Dividing the RR group participants in accordance with their responses to the 
manipulation check produced a result that was approaching statistical significance: H(4) = 
9.07, p = .06. Post-hoc Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that RR group participants who 
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interpreted the primes as being reward-related offered more money to charity (M = $0.59) 
than participants in all other groups: RN (M = $0.40; U = 144, p = .04), SR (M = $0.38; U = 
143.5, p = .04), and SN (M = $0.30; U = 107.5, p < .01). However, only the contrast with the 
SN group remains significant after controlling for multiple comparisons. These findings are 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Differences in generosity across conditions after dividing RR group 
participants according to their responses on the manipulation check. 
No significant differences in self-reported positive affect were observed across the 
four experimental conditions: H(3) = 3.64, p = .30. Dividing the RR group in accordance with 
participants’ responses on the manipulation check item did not change this result: H(4) = 
4.81, p = .31. In terms of self-reported negative affect, no significant differences were 
observed across the experimental conditions: H(3) = 2.31, p = .51. Dividing the RR group in 
accordance with participants’ responses on the manipulation check item did not change this 
result: H(4) = 5.10, p = .28. 
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Discussion 
Implications for the Supernatural Reward Hypothesis 
It was hypothesised that participants presented with implicit reward-related religious 
primes would be more generous than participants exposed to neutral religious primes and 
control primes. This hypothesis was moderately supported by the data. While the religious 
reward group as a whole did not give more generously than any of the other experimental 
groups, participants who interpreted the implicit reward-related religious primes as being 
relevant to God’s rewards, as opposed to God’s mercifulness, did give more generously than 
participants in the religious neutral (RN), secular reward (SR), and control (SN) conditions. 
While this finding was expected, and does appear to support the SRH, the data must 
be interpreted with caution. Each of the groups in Study 3 featured approximately 30 
participants, and this finding (i.e., that generosity in the religious reward condition was 
moderated by how the primes were interpreted by participants) was obtained by splitting the 
already small religious reward group, approximately, in half.  Further research will need to be 
undertaken to confirm whether or not this effect would still be apparent in a much larger 
sample. 
Despite the small sample size, the findings of Study 3 indicate a clear prosocial effect 
of reward-related religious primes (so long as those primes are interpreted as such); hence, 
Study 3 is the first successful replication of the findings of Harrell (2012). These findings 
raise questions as to whether implicit reward-related religious primes can effectively promote 
other forms of behavioural prosociality (e.g., blood donations or volunteering to help others), 
besides charitable giving. Perhaps such primes may also influence attitudinal prosociality, as 
Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016, Study 1) found to be the case with implicit punishment-
related religious primes. Future research can test these possibilities, and the findings of Study 
3 seem to warrant further testing of the SRH. 
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But while the findings of Study 3 do replicate the findings of Harrell (2012), and do 
support the SRH, there were also several unexpected findings. The first unexpected finding 
was that participants in the secular reward condition were no more generous than participants 
in any of the other experimental groups. Harrell (2012) found that the subliminal priming of 
secular reward-related concepts (e.g., ‘applause’) was equally effective, relative to the 
subliminal priming of reward-related religious concepts, at increasing generosity. In Study 3, 
only the reward-related religious primes appeared to have any such effect. This suggests that 
the religious element of the reward-related religious primes may have underlay the apparent 
prosocial effect. However, just as reward-related secular primes did not appear to elicit any 
prosocial effects, neutral religious primes (e.g., ‘God’) did not appear to have any such 
effects either. This finding suggests that it is the interaction of the reward-related and 
religious elements of the primed concepts that resulted in the increase in generosity. Given 
that all participants in Study 3 were Christians, perhaps the results suggest that secular forms 
of reward are less enticing/important to Christians or to religious people generally. Further 
research (with larger samples) is needed to determine whether the findings of Study 3 or 
Harrell’s study more accurately represent reality, or whether methodological differences (e.g., 
the priming paradigms utilised) between these two studies explain the different results. 
The second unexpected finding in Study 3 was an inverse correlation between 
religious devoutness and generosity in the religious reward condition. One would expect that 
people who are more devoutly religious would respond more positively to religious primes 
than people who are less devout, and yet, while generosity correlated positively with religious 
devoutness in the religious neutral condition (as expected), the opposite effect was observed 
in the religious reward condition. While this finding seems surprising on its face, there is a 
fairly plausible explanation for this inverse correlation. As was noted earlier, it is possible 
that many of the more devout Christians in the study were more aware of the unclear 
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connection between moral conduct and divine rewards in Christian doctrine than the less 
devout Christians. Such knowledge may have led some of the more devout participants, who 
interpreted the primes as being reflective of God’s rewarding nature, to give less generously 
than less devout participants. Similarly, more devout participants in the religious reward 
condition who interpreted the primes as being reflective of God’s mercifulness may have 
donated less money because they felt more assured of God’s mercy and may have held a 
firmer belief that these rewards were not contingent upon the selflessness/prosociality of their 
conduct. 
One problem with this interpretation of the negative correlation observed between 
religious devoutness and generosity in the religious reward condition is that this same 
correlation was not observed in the religious reward condition in Study 1, or in either of the 
conditions in Study 2 (both of which involved religious reward primes). Given that the 
reward-related religious primes in those studies were passages of text specifically discussing 
the supposed link between prosocial behaviour and divine rewards, one would expect not 
only to observe the same negative correlation between religious devoutness and generosity as 
was found in Study 3, but perhaps an even stronger correlation. Hence, the differences in 
findings across Studies 1 – 3 are difficult to reconcile. 
While Study 3 was not without many limitations (e.g., low sample size; see 
Limitations section below), the findings of this study have raised many questions, and justify 
further empirical investigations of what appears to be a complex relationship between belief 
in supernatural reward concepts and behavioural prosociality. 
Divine Benevolence and Mercifulness, and Prosociality 
 In addition to providing evidence supporting the SRH, the findings of Study 3 also 
lend further support to the contention that the priming of divine mercifulness concepts does 
not effectively promote prosociality. Participants who interpreted the reward-related religious 
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primes as being reflective of God’s mercifulness offered to give no more money to charity 
than participants in the control condition, which suggests that thoughts about divine 
benevolence have no effects on behavioural prosociality. 
Two previous studies demonstrated that the priming of divine benevolence concepts is 
no more effective at promoting attitudinal (Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016, Study 2) or 
behavioural (Card, 2013, Study 1) prosociality, and the findings of Study 3 reinforce those 
previous findings. However, as was outlined above, numerous studies have shown that the 
priming of divine benevolence/mercifulness concepts can actually decrease prosociality. For 
example, Card (2013, Study 2) found that participants primed with divine benevolence 
concepts cheated during a quiz task more often than participants in the control condition. In 
Study 1 of this thesis (see above), participants who read the passage of text that spoke of God 
as being merciful and forgiving gave away less money in the Dictator Game than participants 
in the control condition did. 
 Because the primes in Study 3 were not designed to reflect God’s mercifulness, the 
effects of these primes may not provide a completely accurate indication of how actual divine 
mercifulness primes influence prosociality. Even though many participants believed that the 
underlying theme in the priming task was God’s mercifulness, the fact that none of the 
priming sentences referred to forgiveness for those who sin, or to God’s kindness and 
tendency towards mercy in general, should not be overlooked. It is possible that the reward-
related religious primes in Study 3 were effective in priming these participants with divine 
reward concepts, but those participants’ subsequent reflections on the sentences they 
constructed led them to think about divine mercifulness. In this way, it is possible that 
exposure to the reward concepts had a prosocial effect, while the detection of an underlying 
theme of divine benevolence/mercifulness had an antisocial effect. Perhaps conflicting effects 
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of this sort resulted in what appeared to be an overall non-effect on prosociality for 
participants who interpreted the reward-related religious primes as being mercy-related. 
 Future research could provide insight into whether or not these conflicting effects are 
likely to be occurring together by replicating Study 3 with the inclusion of a religious 
mercifulness priming condition. If participants presented with implicit mercy-related 
religious primes are less generous than participants presented with control primes, then this 
may suggest that participants who interpret reward-related religious primes as being related to 
divine mercifulness are being primed in two different directions (i.e., by the actual content of 
the primes, and by their own reflections on the underlying theme that connects the sentences 
in the SUT). 
Limitations 
 While the findings of Study 3 do have noteworthy implications for the SRH 
specifically, and religion-prosociality literature generally, this study had many limitations. 
Foremost among these limitations was the small sample size. Distinguishing between 
participants who interpreted the reward-related religious primes differently entailed splitting 
an already small group in half, and thus, it is possible that the results obtained stem, at least 
partially, from this shortcoming. On this basis, until the findings of Study 3 are replicated in a 
larger sample of participants, these results should be interpreted with caution.  
 Another weakness of this study was the non-inclusion of a religious mercy priming 
condition. As was noted in the previous section, the inclusion of a condition utilising mercy-
related religious primes may have provided important insights as to why the reward-related 
religious primes only increased the generosity of participants who detected the religious 
reward theme, and not for those who thought the theme of the SUT was God’s mercifulness. 
 It should also be noted that all participants in Study 3 resided in the United States, and 
all participants identified as Christians. Hence, the findings of this study may not generalise 
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to non-Western or non-Christian cultures. If different cultures and religious traditions place 
different levels of emphasis on divine reward concepts, then the prosocial effects of reward-
related religious primes would most likely differ across those cultures and religious 
traditions.  
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General Discussion 
Reward-Related Religious Primes and Prosociality 
 The three studies detailed above constitute a multifaceted investigation of the 
supernatural reward hypothesis (SRH). Prior to these studies, only a single empirical study 
(i.e., Harrell, 2012) had explored whether the priming of supernatural reward concepts can 
effectively increase behavioural prosociality. While Harrell tested the SRH using subliminal 
reward-related religious primes, the studies outlined above tested the SRH using a general 
explicit priming method (Study 1), a more culturally-sensitive explicit priming method 
(Study 2), and an implicit priming method (Study 3). Both explicit priming studies failed to 
demonstrate a significant prosocial effect of general or culturally-specific reward-related 
religious primes, but the implicit priming study (Study 3) did yield some supporting evidence 
for the SRH. Though the results varied across these three studies, collectively, these findings 
have considerable implications for the SRH, and the religious priming literature generally.  
 The findings of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that reward-related religious primes – even 
when tailored to the specific religious group (Christians, in this instance) being primed – are 
ineffective at increasing behavioural prosociality. However, as I outlined above, it is possible 
that explicit reward-related religious primes are generally ineffective at promoting 
prosociality because participants themselves may notice that they are thinking selfishly (i.e., 
allowing reward-oriented thinking to influence their generosity), and may consequently 
decide to be less generous in an attempt to be more impartial. Contrastively, because the 
centrality and purpose of the reward-related religious primes were less obvious to participants 
in Study 3 (within which implicit primes were used), it is possible that the supernatural 
reward theme did not become conspicuous enough to motivate participants to suppress their 
reward-oriented thinking. 
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While none of the results obtained across Studies 1 – 3 refute this contention, 
responses to the suspicion probe items in Studies 1 and 2 suggested that very few participants 
were aware of the purpose of the study.16 That is, the vast majority of participants expressed 
no suspicion that the reward-related elements of the passage of text they read were designed 
to influence their generosity in the Dictator Game. Hence, it seems unlikely that participants’ 
possible active suppression of reward-based thinking explains the null results. However, it is 
still possible that participants were aware that the primes had influenced their decision-
making, without them concluding that this was the purpose of the study. The inclusion of a 
final open-ended question asking participants what influenced their decision-making in the 
Dictator Game may have been appropriate for addressing this problem. 
Intergroup differences in mood do not appear to be relevant to any of the effects (or 
null effects) observed across Studies 1 – 3 either. The PANAS was used to determine whether 
exposure to different categories of primes would result in differences in positive and/or 
negative affect across experimental groups. No differences in mood were observed between 
any of the experimental groups in any of the three studies. This indicates that the 
positivity/negativity of mood was not a causal factor in any intergroup differences in 
generosity (e.g., between the religious kindness group and other groups in Study 1) observed 
across Studies 1 – 3. Similarly, the null effects of explicit reward-related religious primes on 
generosity (relative to control group participants) in Study 1 cannot be attributed to 
differences in positive/negative affect across conditions. 
As was noted earlier, it is also possible that an in-person study might have yielded 
different results. Harrell’s (2012) study was conducted in laboratory settings, whereas Studies 
1 and 2 (see above) were conducted entirely online, and the observed effects of reward-
                                                 
16 Too few participants expressed awareness of the purpose of the study for any meaningful comparison to be 
made between the generosity of omitted participants and those who expressed no awareness of the purpose of 
the study. 
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related religious primes differed across these studies. However, while it is possible that 
reward-related religious primes may be more effective in in-person/laboratory studies – as a 
simplistic comparison of the findings of Harrell and Studies 1 and 2 would suggest – this 
seems unlikely. There are no obvious theoretical reasons as to why reward-related religious 
primes would be less effective in online settings than in laboratory settings. Moreover, 
Summerville and Chartier (2013, Study 2) found that the giving behaviours of online 
participants who play the Dictator Game reflect a belief that the ‘receiver’ participant is a real 
person. Additionally, Amir, Rand and Gal (2012) found that the proportion of money given 
by online participants in the Dictator Game was comparable to what is typically given in 
laboratory studies (see the meta-analysis conducted by Engel, 2011). These findings 
challenge any suspicion that online participants simply find the Dictator Game scenario less 
believable/plausible than laboratory participants do. Indeed, if this were so, it would be 
difficult to explain why a difference in generosity was observed between participants in the 
religious kindness condition and participants in the religious reward and control groups (see 
Study 1). 
 A more plausible explanation for the null findings in Studies 1 and 2 emerged in 
Study 3. The results of this study suggested that any effects that reward-related religious 
primes may have on prosociality are likely to be moderated by how those primes are 
interpreted by individual participants. In Study 3, participants who interpreted implicit 
reward-related religious primes as being reminders of God’s rewards donated approximately 
twice as much money (see Figure 4 above) as those who interpreted the primes as being 
indicative of God’s mercifulness. This finding suggests that certain interpretations of reward-
related religious primes can be conducive to prosociality, while others may be unconducive to 
prosociality. As I have argued, different thoughts about why certain rewards are received are 
likely to produce differences in behaviour. Namely, those who believe that divine rewards are 
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received because God is merciful do not necessarily need to behave prosocially to attain those 
rewards, whereas those who believe that prosocial behaviour is – at least in part – a means to 
the end of receiving those divine rewards have a clear incentive to behave prosocially. But 
the question arises: why were the reward-related religious primes in Study 3 so often 
interpreted as being reflective of divine mercifulness? 
It is noteworthy that all of the reward-related religious primes utilised across Studies 1 
– 3 portrayed God positively (i.e., as a rewarder of good behaviour), while none of the primes 
portrayed God negatively (i.e., as someone who would readily and gladly deny rewards to 
those who misbehave). For this reason, it is unsurprising that participants in Study 3 often 
interpreted the reward-related religious primes as being indicative of God’s general 
benevolence/mercifulness. Perhaps greater emphasis on the idea that the divine rewards 
available to believers are strictly contingent upon their moral conduct, rather than being 
available irrespective of their moral/immoral conduct, would have reduced the likelihood of 
participants interpreting the reward-related religious primes as being indicative of general 
divine benevolence.  
While Studies 1 – 3 all suffered from this methodological shortcoming, only Study 3 
included a mechanism (i.e., the forced-choice manipulation check item) capable of addressing 
it. The forced-choice question asked participants whether the theme of the passage they read 
was relevant to particular attributes of God (i.e., anger, apathy, leniency, mercifulness, 
punishments, rewards, or vengeance). Unlike the questions in Studies 1 and 2 (asking what 
the passages of text were about), this forced-choice option demanded that participants 
consider the underlying theme of the task.  Even if some participants’ interpretations of the 
primes in Study 3 were influenced by the positive portrayal of God in those primes, the 
manipulation check item facilitated at least an imperfect distinction between those 
participants and others whose interpretations may have been less affected. Contrastively, 
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Studies 1 and 2 did not include systematic measures for checking whether participants were 
actually interpreting the reward-related passages of text as being relevant to divine 
mercifulness or divine rewards. Participants in Studies 1 and 2 were only asked to summarise 
the text they read, rather than to interpret it, or to identify its underlying themes. Hence, the 
null effects of reward-related religious primes in those studies may stem from undetected 
differences in how participants interpreted the reward-related religious passage. 
It is also possible that exposure to reward-related religious primes may have – due to 
conceptual overlap – primed participants with divine reward concepts and divine 
benevolence/mercifulness concepts. Given that these two distinct concepts appear to have 
contrasting/conflicting effects on prosociality (e.g., contrast the findings of Harrell, 2012, 
with those of DeBono et al., 2017; also see Studies 1 and 3 above), the simultaneous priming 
of these distinct concepts may appear to have no influence on prosociality. 
Divine Mercifulness Primes and Prosociality 
One of the contentions expressed throughout this thesis was that divine 
benevolence/mercifulness and divine reward concepts are related, but distinct. While the 
offering of divine rewards may be a form of benevolence, a god could – at least in theory – 
offer supernatural rewards to compliant believers whilst still being generally malevolent 
and/or cruel. Furthermore, the provision of rewards in return for obedience is not a form of 
mercifulness; rather, mercifulness entails the provision of rewards (or the suspension or 
withholding of punishments) for those who have exhibited disobedience. In this sense, it 
seems clear that divine benevolence/mercifulness and divine reward concepts should not be 
conflated. 
There was already a growing body of literature suggesting that concepts of divine 
benevolence and divine mercifulness are unconducive to prosocial behaviour. Relative to 
other primed religious concepts (e.g., supernatural punishment), the priming of religious 
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participants with concepts of divine benevolence, forgiveness and mercy has commonly 
resulted in increased anti-social behaviour (see Card, 2013, Study 2; DeBono et al., 2017, 
Studies 2 – 3; also see Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011). Some studies have found divine 
benevolence/mercifulness primes to be no more effective than control primes at influencing 
prosocial attitudes (Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016, Study 2) or behaviours (Card, 2013, Study 
1). The results of Studies 1 and 3 (above) contribute to this body of literature. 
While DeBono et al. (2017) found that divine forgiveness primes generally increased 
anti-social behaviour (e.g., cheating during quiz tasks), they noted that this does not 
necessarily mean that such primes will reduce positive forms of prosocial behaviour (e.g., 
generosity). No previous studies had explored the effects of divine benevolence/mercifulness 
primes on the financial generosity of religious people. The findings of Study 1 are significant 
because they demonstrate that divine forgiveness/mercifulness primes can reduce positive 
forms of prosociality, such as generosity. Participants presented with a passage of text 
referring to God’s merciful and forgiving nature were less generous than control group 
participants in the Dictator Game. Importantly, they were also less generous than participants 
who read a passage of text about the ways in which God rewards moral behaviour. This latter 
finding provides clear empirical support for the notion that concepts of divine 
benevolence/mercifulness and divine reward should be treated as distinct. 
Such results as those outlined above are unsurprising. If the receipt of rewards is only 
assured by compliance with certain rules, then people have an obvious incentive to comply 
with those rules. If the receipt of rewards is assured even to those who are perpetually 
uncompliant, then there is little incentive to comply with those rules. In fact, there is an 
obvious incentive not to comply, as violators will profit – additionally – from their violations. 
For example, if someone can steal somebody else’s property and still be granted entry into 
Heaven, then he/she has received two rewards (i.e., stolen property and entry into Heaven), 
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whereas someone who decides not to steal somebody else’s property will only receive one 
reward (i.e., entry into Heaven). 
It should be noted, however, that the results of Study 3 ostensibly conflicted with 
those of Study 1. While the results of Study 1 demonstrated a negative effect of divine 
forgiveness/mercifulness primes on generosity, the findings of Study 3 indicated that 
religious people who interpret primes as being related to divine mercifulness are no more 
generous than control group participants. In Study 3, participants in the religious reward 
condition who interpreted the primes as being related to divine mercifulness gave away about 
the same amount of money to charity as participants in the control condition. Given that 
Studies 1 and 3 (see above) used highly similar methods for testing participants’ generosity 
(i.e., the Dictator Game in Study 1, and a slight variation of the Dictator Game in Study 3), it 
may seem peculiar that one study would show a significant difference in generosity between 
control group participants and participants primed with divine mercifulness concepts (Study 
1), while the other would indicate that there is no such difference between the two groups 
(Study 3). Why would two highly similar studies yield such contrastive findings? 
The answer to this question may stem from an important difference between Studies 1 
and 3. With regard to the priming of divine benevolence/mercifulness concepts, Yilmaz and 
Bahçekapili (2016, Study 2) had participants read a passage of text that focused explicitly on 
God’s tendency to forgive those who make mistakes and repent, and Card (2013, Studies 1 – 
2) had participants read magazine-style articles, which portrayed God as being kind and 
benevolent. In those previous studies, concepts of divine benevolence were deliberately being 
primed by the researchers. The concept of divine benevolence/mercifulness was also central 
and overt in the priming passage in Study 1. Contrastively, in Study 3, the primes used were 
intended to prime participants with divine reward concepts, and as I outlined earlier, a 
supernatural agent does not need to be benevolent to promise divine rewards to adherents. 
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While many participants detected a divine mercifulness theme, all participants in the religious 
reward group were still presented with a conspicuous theme of contingent divine rewards 
(i.e., the idea that God only rewards good behaviour), and this may also have influenced their 
giving behaviours. 
If primes are likely to be interpreted in different ways by different participants, and if 
individual participants are able to detect multiple distinct themes within single primes (e.g., 
short sentences or passages of text), then it will always be difficult to conclude which 
particular interpretations/themes underlie any effects – or even null effects – observed. For 
this reason, it is necessary to address the broader and important problem of conceptual 
overlap. 
The Wider Conceptual Overlap Problem 
 Throughout this thesis, I have argued that it is imperative that the primes used in 
religious priming research be as conceptually clear and specific as possible. Conceptual 
clarity and specificity will reduce the degree to which interpretations of individual primes 
differ and should reduce the number of distinct themes detected by participants. If primes are 
conceptually vague/ambiguous, then different participants may interpret them differently, and 
individual participants may be primed with multiple concepts at once. 
This is not an abstract concern without an empirical basis in the psychological 
literature. As I noted earlier, Pichon et al. (2007; Study 1) found that participants exposed to 
religious primes of a ‘positive’ nature exhibited increased helping behaviour, relative to 
participants exposed to ‘neutral’ religious primes or secular primes. But simply classifying 
religious primes as positive (or even ‘neutral’; see below) is problematic because different 
concepts may be positive for different reasons. For example, the word ‘heaven’ may be 
positive because it refers to a grand reward that religious people can attain, while the word 
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‘communion’ may be positive because it is related to valued traditions and a sense of 
religious community.17 
 The findings of Harrell (2012) demonstrated that conceptual overlap of this sort may 
have been a considerable problem in the study conducted by Pichon et al. (2007). Three of 
the prime-words in Harrell’s religious reward condition (‘heaven’, ‘miracle’ and ‘salvation’) 
were present in Pichon et al.’s positive religious condition, and two of the prime-words in 
Harrell’s reward-unrelated religious condition (‘pilgrimage’ and ‘temple’) were present in 
Pichon et al.’s neutral religious condition. Despite a pre-test study revealing that participants 
considered all five of these words to be equally positive, Harrell found that participants in the 
religious reward condition were more generous than participants in the reward-unrelated 
religious condition. At the very least, this finding suggests that some primes with positive 
content influence prosociality more significantly than others. It could also be argued that it is 
not the general positive connotations of religious primes that promote prosociality, but rather, 
it is likely that some positive religious themes (e.g., reward) promote prosociality while 
others are uninfluential (or even reduce prosociality; e.g., divine mercifulness primes have 
been found to reduce prosociality and increase anti-sociality in several studies). In Pichon et 
al.’s study, the effects observed may have stemmed from the effects of some primes in the 
positive religious condition (e.g., ‘heaven’), but not others (e.g., ‘temple’). 
 Further evidence against the idea that generically positive religious primes increase 
prosociality came from Study 1 (above). Divine mercifulness and forgiveness are ostensibly 
positive concepts, and yet, the priming of religious participants with such concepts has been 
found to reduce prosocial behaviour (see Study 1, above), and even to increase antisocial 
behaviour (e.g., Card, 2013, Study 2; DeBono et al., 2017, Study 2). These findings, in 
addition to those of Harrell (2012), clearly demonstrate that the umbrella term ‘positive’ is far 
                                                 
17 Both of these words (i.e., ‘communion’ and ‘heaven’) were used by Pichon et al. (2007, Study 1). 
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too broad. The term encompasses positive concepts that have been linked to prosociality 
(e.g., reward) and positive concepts that have been linked to reductions in prosociality (e.g., 
divine forgiveness/mercifulness). 
 The problem of conceptual overlap is not restricted to instances where different 
primes under the same umbrella heading could/should be placed into separate sub-categories. 
There are also instances wherein the same prime-word or priming passage can be interpreted 
as belonging to different or multiple sub-categories. In the case of positive religious primes, 
individual religious concepts may be positive for a multitude of different reasons, and to 
different extents. For example, the word ‘Christmas’ may be positive because it reminds 
people of religious tradition(s) and time spent with their families, but this word may also be 
positive because it reminds people that they will be receiving gifts (i.e., eliciting reward-
anticipation).18 
 The findings of Study 3 (above) demonstrate the relevance of this type of conceptual 
overlap to investigations of the SRH. Even though none of the priming sentences in the 
religious reward condition contained obvious references to divine mercifulness, many 
participants still detected this theme, as their responses to the manipulation check item 
indicate. While the use of implicit primes (relative to explicit primes) should reduce the 
amount of rumination that participants are likely to devote to the primed concepts, about half 
of the participants in the religious reward condition of Study 3 were still able to detect a 
divine mercifulness theme. Hence, while participants were forced to choose only one theme 
that was present in the SUT, it is possible that participants actually detected multiple themes 
(e.g., God’s mercifulness and God’s rewards), and simply selected the theme that they 
believed was most prominent. If this was the case, it is possible that specific concepts/themes 
(e.g., divine benevolence and divine reward) that were being simultaneously primed elicited 
                                                 
18 The word ‘Christmas’ was listed as a positive religious prime by Pichon et al. (2007, Study 1). 
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opposing effects that may have cancelled each other out. Perhaps participants who responded 
that the underlying theme of the SUT was divine reward(s) would have donated more, were it 
not for the possible simultaneous priming of divine mercifulness concepts. Perhaps 
participants who responded that the underlying theme was God’s mercifulness would have 
donated less, were it not for the simultaneous priming of divine reward concepts. 
These contentions are supported by the findings of Study 1. The prime in the religious 
kindness condition was a passage of text devoted specifically to concepts of divine 
forgiveness and mercifulness, without any reference to supernatural rewards (e.g., eternal 
life). Participants in that group gave away about half as much money as participants in the 
religious reward group and the control group. Participants in the religious reward group gave 
away no more money than control group participants, but as I argued in the preceding 
sections, this finding may have been due to participants interpreting the reward-related 
religious passage as being reflective of a generally benevolent and merciful God.  
 A broader problem affecting studies testing the effects of specific types of religious 
primes (e.g., reward-related) on prosociality has been the use of so-called ‘neutral’ religious 
conditions. Research testing the effects of specific types of religious primes arose due to 
recognition that the monolithic categorisation of primes as “religious” was inadequate and 
was unlikely to capture many of the nuances with regard to how religious belief influences 
attitudes and behaviours (Preston & Ritter, 2013; Ritter & Preston, 2013; Saleam & 
Moustafa, 2016). Despite this, many studies testing the effects of specific religious primes 
have utilised similarly monolithic categories as a basis for comparison with their more 
specific categories (e.g., see Harrell, 201219; Pichon et al., 2007; Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 
2016, Study 120). This criticism is equally applicable to Study 3 (above), which featured a 
                                                 
19 Harrell (2012) used a ‘reward-unrelated religious’ condition. This is no different to a typical ‘neutral 
religious’ condition, as this category includes all religious concepts except reward-related ones. 
20 Yilmaz and Bahçekapili (2016, Study 1) used a ‘non-punishing religious’ category, which acted as their 
neutral religious category. 
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‘religious neutral’ condition within which a broad range of conceptually distinct prime-words 
were used (e.g., ‘church’, ‘God’, ‘prayer’). 
One could argue that, although ‘neutral’ religious priming categories will encompass 
a broad range of conceptually-distinct primes, the priming effects of those distinct concepts 
will be small. For example, consider a hypothetical neutral religious priming condition that 
contains the prime-words: ‘Hell’, ‘God’, ‘church’, and ‘forgiveness’. These words appear to 
prime concepts of divine punishment, supernatural agents, religious institutions, and divine 
mercifulness, respectively. Because only a single word primes each of these concepts, any 
effects of the priming of those concepts may be small and could even be counteracted by the 
effects of the other prime-words (e.g., divine mercifulness and punishment primes may have 
conflicting effects). Future research could explore this possibility by testing whether the 
proportion of prime-words belonging to a particular category (e.g., punishment-related or 
reward-related) is related to the magnitude of any prosocial effects observed. Future research 
could also examine whether certain categories of primes counteract the effects of others (e.g., 
perhaps the effects of divine mercifulness primes will counteract the effects of divine 
punishment primes). 
The problem of conceptual overlap should be a serious consideration for future 
researchers because the use of certain primes in their ‘neutral religious’ conditions could 
produce prosocial effects that make those of their more specific religious primes appear less 
significant than they would be if more appropriate comparison prime-words were to be 
chosen. Moreover, the use of broad categorisations of primes will make the interpretation of 
data difficult. Besides studies contrasting the effects of conceptually-specific religious primes 
(e.g., reward-related or punishment-related), many studies in the religion-prosociality priming 
literature have simply used a single and monolithic ‘religious priming’ category, without any 
sub-categories (e.g., Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2011; Aveyard, 2014, Study 1; Randolph-Seng 
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& Nielsen, 2007; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007).21 Such studies may demonstrate that priming 
people with religious concepts can increase attitudinal and/or behavioural prosociality, but 
they offer very limited insights as to how/why the religious primes are eliciting prosocial 
effects. Without the appropriate (sub-)categorisation of religious primes, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether it is the priming of religious concepts in general that is producing the 
observed effects, or whether only specific categories of religious concepts are eliciting the 
observed effects (Saleam & Moustafa, 2016). 
In order to categorise religious primes, researchers need some understanding of how 
most participants interpret the prime-words they are presented with. In their cluster-analytical 
study, Ritter and Preston (2013) presented participants with a list of 32 religious words on a 
screen and had them sort those words into 2 – 5 categories based on criteria chosen by the 
participants (e.g., they could create one category for agent-related words and/or one category 
for positive/negative words, etc.). Ritter and Preston found that participants’ categorisations 
of the religious words formed three clear clusters: agents (e.g., ‘angel’, ‘God’), 
spiritual/abstract concepts (e.g., ‘faith’, ‘prayer’) and institutional/concrete concepts (e.g., 
‘Bible’, ‘church’). Additionally, the words ‘heaven’, ‘miracle’ and ‘salvation’ clustered 
closely together in Ritter and Preston’s cluster-analytical study, which suggests that 
supernatural rewards should be treated as a separate category (Saleam & Moustafa, 2016; 
also see Harrell, 2012). Empirical research also suggests that concepts of divine mercifulness 
(e.g., Card, 2013; DeBono et al., 2017; also see Study 1 above) and divine punishment (e.g., 
DeBono et al., 2017; Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016) should be treated as belonging to separate 
categories. Perhaps a largescale cluster-analytical study featuring more participants and a 
larger number of religion-related words could reveal other categories of religious concepts. 
                                                 
21 Four out of the five religious primes used by Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) were agent-related (‘divine’, 
‘God’, ‘prophet’ and ‘spirit’); hence, it may be concluded that agent-related religious primes elicited the 
observed effects. However, there was no second religious priming condition using non-agent-related primes as a 
basis for comparison. For a more comprehensive critique of this study, see Randolph-Seng and Nielsen (2008). 
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Once clear religious prime categories have been identified, researchers can compare 
the prosocial effects of primes from different categories. Knowledge of which primes elicit 
prosocial effects, which primes elicit no prosocial effects, and which primes elicit antisocial 
effects will promote a more comprehensive understanding of how religious beliefs influence 
prosociality. 
Conclusions 
Ultimately, the mixed findings across Studies 1 – 3 raise no fewer questions than they 
answer. The findings of Study 3 suggest that implicit reward-related religious primes can 
increase generosity if participants interpret those primes as being related to God’s rewards. 
Contrastively, the findings of Study 1 suggest that explicit reward-related religious primes are 
ineffective at increasing generosity, and the findings of Study 2 indicate that the null finding 
in Study 1 did not stem from a lack of cultural-specificity of the reward-related religious 
priming passage utilised. However, an extrapolation of the findings of Study 3 would suggest 
that the null findings in Study 1 may have stemmed from undetected differences in how 
participants were interpreting the content of the reward-related religious priming passage 
(e.g., as being related to divine mercifulness and/or divine reward). Future explicit priming 
research is needed to investigate this possibility. 
While evidence regarding the prosocial effects of reward-related religious primes was 
mixed, the hypothesis that concepts of divine benevolence/mercifulness and divine rewards 
have distinct behavioural influences was supported by the data (see Studies 1 and 3). In Study 
1, a clear difference in generosity was observed between participants in the religious reward 
condition and the religious kindness condition. Additionally, the findings of Study 3 showed 
that different interpretations of reward-related religious primes – as being reflective of the 
rewards that God offers or how merciful God is – result in different giving behaviours. 
Collectively, these findings support the contention made throughout this thesis that future 
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priming studies designed to test the SRH should clearly distinguish between concepts of (1) 
contingent divine rewards and (2) divine benevolence/mercifulness.  
Relatedly, the hypothesis that concepts of divine benevolence may influence people to 
behave less prosocially and/or anti-socially (see DeBono et al., 2017) was also supported by 
the data. The findings of Study 1 contribute to a growing body of empirical research 
indicating that the priming of divine benevolence/mercifulness concepts negatively 
influences the behavioural prosociality of religious people. And while the findings of Study 3 
showed that participants who interpreted religious reward primes as being reflective of God’s 
mercifulness were no less generous than control group participants, this may be because they 
were simultaneously primed with divine reward concepts. 
Future Directions 
 The findings of Studies 1 – 3 have important implications for any future 
investigations of the SRH, and for religious priming research in general. However, as I noted 
throughout this thesis, a particularly noteworthy issue in the religious priming literature has 
been the common utilisation of small sample sizes (see van Elk et al., 2016). While the 
findings of Studies 1 – 3 may provide some insights regarding the veracity of the SRH and 
suggest a complex relation between divine reward concepts and prosociality (i.e., that 
participants’ interpretations of reward-related religious primes can differ in consequential 
ways), all three studies utilised small samples of participants; hence, all findings across these 
studies must be interpreted with caution. Replication of Studies 1 – 3 with larger sample sizes 
(i.e., upward of 75 participants per experimental group) would strengthen the conclusions 
detailed above and provide a stronger foundation for future investigations of the merits of the 
SRH. 
Future researchers testing the SRH should carefully develop reward-related religious 
primes (whether implicit or explicit) to avoid – to the fullest extent possible – conceptual 
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overlap between religious reward concepts and divine benevolence/mercifulness concepts. As 
I noted above, the reward-related religious primes used in Studies 1 – 3 (above) all portrayed 
God as a benevolent figure, and this introduced considerable unintended conceptual overlap. 
Because the provision of divine rewards is reflective of divine benevolence, concepts of 
divine reward and divine benevolence/mercifulness are difficult to disentangle. Future 
researchers are advised to consider utilising primes that not only portray God as a rewarder of 
good deeds, but also as a deity who will deny rewards to those who are disobedient. The 
inclusion of such primes should reduce the extent to which participants interpret reward-
related religious primes as being reflective of God’s general benevolence/mercifulness.  
 Future researchers testing the SRH might also consider testing whether reward-related 
religious primes increase/decrease antisocial behaviours. For example, researchers could test 
whether participants exposed to reward-related religious primes are more or less likely to 
cheat (when given the opportunity) in quiz tasks. The only religious priming studies that have 
tested the effects of reward-related religious primes (i.e., Harrell, 2012; Studies 1 – 3 above) 
have focused on prosocial behaviour (i.e., generosity). Perhaps studies testing the SRH could 
be conducted in more naturalistic settings. For example, researchers could test whether 
religious people who just listened to a sermon focusing on divine rewards donate more 
money to charity than participants who listen to a sermon that does not focus on divine 
rewards or punishments. 
Irrespective of the particular hypothesis being tested, future researchers are strongly 
advised to utilise manipulation check items when priming specific types of religious concepts 
(e.g., reward-related). Manipulation checks are not only necessary to ensure that priming has 
occurred; Study 3 (above) demonstrated that manipulation checks are also necessary to 
ensure that participants are being primed with the concepts that researchers intend to prime 
them with. Approximately half of the participants in the religious reward group thought that 
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the theme of the SUT was divine mercifulness, while the other half thought that the theme of 
the SUT was divine reward. If participants interpret primes differently than expected, and 
these different interpretations lead to different behavioural consequences, then researchers 
may end up making inaccurate conclusions (e.g., one could conclude that supernatural reward 
primes do not increase prosociality, even though the prime-words utilised were priming some 
participants with divine mercifulness concepts). Hence, the inclusion of items capable of 
detecting such interpretational differences is essential. Perhaps simpler manipulation-check 
items (e.g., the forced-choice question in Study 3) could be used in addition to more open-
ended questions probing participants’ interpretations/understandings of the primes they are 
presented with. 
Regarding investigations of the SRH specifically, appropriate manipulation check 
items could be effective at determining whether explicit reward-related religious primes are 
ineffective at eliciting prosocial effects due to the possible active suppression of reward-
oriented thinking by participants. Replication of Studies 1 and 2 with the inclusion of 
measures for detecting what participants think the underlying themes of the primes are could 
settle this issue. For example, if participants who interpret an explicit reward-related religious 
prime as being reflective of God’s rewarding nature give more generously than those who 
think that the same prime is reflective of God’s mercifulness, then this would suggest that 
distinct interpretations of the same prime can greatly influence the results. Such a finding 
would, therefore, indicate that it is not the suppression of reward-oriented/selfish thinking 
that makes participants exposed to explicit reward-related religious primes appear no more 
inclined towards generosity than control group participants. 
Future comparative research as to the effects of reward-related religious and secular 
primes is also warranted. Interestingly, while both studies found reward-related religious 
primes to be effective at increasing generosity, Harrell (2012) found that subliminal reward-
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related secular primes were effective at increasing generosity, Study 3 failed to find such an 
effect using implicit reward-related secular primes. This latter finding suggests that religious 
people value secular rewards (e.g., awards) less than religious rewards (e.g., salvation) when 
those rewards are being consciously appraised. However, given the low sample size used in 
Study 3, this finding needs to be replicated, perhaps with the inclusion of nonreligious 
participants. If nonreligious people respond more prosocially after exposure to both types of 
reward primes or only to secular reward primes, while religious people only respond more 
prosocially when exposed to religious reward primes, then this would suggest that religious 
belief results in the devaluing/discounting of secular rewards (e.g., awards and fame). 
 Largescale cluster-analytical studies of the sort conducted by Ritter and Preston 
(2013) would also be useful in the context of the religious priming literature. Such studies 
may yield data that would allow future researchers to create religious priming categories 
based on how participants themselves tend to interpret particular prime-words. While 
researchers could form categories of religious primes themselves, there is no guarantee that 
laymen will interpret the prime-words identically to the researchers. For example, the 
religious reward primes that I utilised in Study 3 were designed specifically to prime 
participants with divine reward concepts. Unexpectedly, half of the participants in the 
religious reward group interpreted the primes as being about God’s mercifulness , despite 
their being no overt references to this concept. Studies exploring how participants themselves 
interpret religious primes may help future researchers to avoid this methodological 
shortcoming. 
Moreover, as Saleam and Moustafa (2016) noted, there is a vast body of priming 
research exploring whether religious primes influence prosociality, but very few studies have 
directly investigated why prosocial effects have been observed. Although recent studies 
demonstrating the prosocial/antisocial effects of particular categories of religious primes 
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(e.g., see Card, 2013; DeBono et al., 2017; Harrell, 2012; Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2016; also 
see Studies 1 and 3 above) allow for more informed conclusions to be drawn about the 
mechanisms (e.g., reward anticipation) underlying the link(s) between religious belief and 
prosociality, such conclusions remain somewhat speculative in the absence of physiological 
and neurological data. 
Physiological (e.g., electrodermal response) and neurological (e.g., functional 
magnetic resonance imaging) studies may help researchers understand the underlying 
mechanisms through which particular religious primes elicit their effects. Such knowledge 
could complement data collected in priming studies. For example, if exposure to divine 
punishment primes increases activity in participants’ amygdalae – a brain region linked to the 
fear response, and which has been found to activate in response to punishment (Orsini & 
Maren, 2012; Moustafa, Gilbertson, Orr, Harzallah, Servatius & Myers, 2013) – this would 
suggest that divine punishment primes are successfully eliciting a fear of punishment in 
participants. Similarly, if divine reward primes were found to increase activity in brain 
regions linked to reward-anticipation (e.g., the nucleus accumbens; see Abe & Greene, 2014), 
this would suggest that divine reward primes are successfully eliciting reward-anticipation in 
participants. Such findings would be significant, as they would suggest that any prosocial 
effects elicited by divine punishment (see Yilmaz & Bahçekapili; also see Hadnes & 
Schumacher, 2012) or divine reward primes (see Harrell, 2012; also see Study 3 above) are 
due to fear of punishment and reward-anticipation, respectively. 
 Ultimately, the findings of Studies 1 – 3 offer numerous insights as to how 
investigations of the SRH, and religious priming research generally, could progress. The 
recommendations listed here are only few among many possibilities. It is hoped that future 
researchers will consider the issues (e.g., conceptual overlap) and recommendations (e.g., 
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diversification of methods) outlined in this thesis, and that the insights produced herein are of 
value to the religious priming literature going forward. 
  
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 100 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
  
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 101 
 
  
References 
 
Abe, N., & Greene, J. D. (2014). Response to anticipated reward in the nucleus accumbens  
predicts behavior in an independent test of honesty. The Journal of Neuroscience,  
34(32), 10564-10572. Doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0217-14.2014 
Ahmed, A. M. (2009). Are religious people more prosocial? A quasi-experimental study with  
Madrasah pupils in a rural community in India. Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion, 48(2), 368-374. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5906.2009.01452.x 
Ahmed, A. & Hammarstedt, M. (2011). The effect of subtle religious representations on  
cooperation. International Journal of Social Economics, 38(11), 900-910. doi: 
10.1108/03068291111171405 
Ahmed, A. M., & Salas, O. (2009). Is the hand of God involved in human cooperation?  
International Journal of Social Economics, 36(1/2), 70-80. doi: 10.1108/ 
03068290910921190 
Ahmed, A. M., & Salas, O. (2011). Implicit influences of Christian religious representations  
on dictator and prisoner’s dilemma game decisions. Journal of Socio-Economics, 
40(3), 242–246. doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2010.12.013 
Alexander, E. (2013). Proof of heaven: A neurosurgeon’s journey into the afterlife. NY,  
United States: Simon & Schuster. 
Amir, O., Rand, D. G., & Gal, Y. K. (2012). Economic games on the Internet: The effect of  
$1 stakes. PLoS ONE, 7(2), e31461. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0031461 
Armour, R. A. (2010). Gods and myths of Ancient Egypt. Cairo, Egypt: The American  
University in Cairo Press. 
Atkinson, Q. D., & Bourrat, P. (2011). Beliefs about God, the afterlife and morality support  
the role of supernatural policing in human cooperation. Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 32, 41-49. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.07.008 
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 102 
 
  
Aveyard, M. E. (2014). A call to honesty: Extending religious priming of moral behavior to  
Middle Eastern Muslims. PLoS ONE, 9(7), e99447. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone. 
0099447 
Barna Group. (2017, May 9). Competing worldviews influence today’s Christians. Retrieved  
on the 4th of February 2018, from: https://www.barna.com/research/competing-
worldviews-influence-todays-christians/ 
Batara, J. B. L., Franco, P. S., Quiachon, M. A. M., & Sembrero, D. R. M. (2016). Effects of  
religious priming concepts on prosocial behavior towards ingroup and outgroup. 
Europe’s Journal of Psychology, 12(4), 635-644. doi: 10.5964/ejop.v12i4.1170 
Bellemare, C., & Kröger, S. (2007). On representative social capital. European Economic  
Review, 51(1), 183-202. doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2006.03.006 
Benjamin, D. J., Choi, J. J., & Fisher, G. (2016). Religious identity and economic behavior.  
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 98(4), 617-637. doi: 10.1162/ 
REST_a_00586 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games  
and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 122-142. doi: 10.1006/game.1995.1027 
Berlinski, D. (2009). The Devil’s delusion: Atheism and its scientific pretensions. NY, United  
States: The Perseus Books Group. 
Budge, E. A. W. (2011). Osiris and the Egyptian resurrection: Volume 1. NY, United States:  
Dover Publications Inc. 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A new  
source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data?. Perspective on Psychological Science, 
6(1), 3-5. doi: 10.1177/1745691610393980 
Burpo, T. (2011). Heaven is for real: A little boy’s astounding story of his trip to Heaven and  
back. Nashville, United States: Thomas Nelson Publishers. 
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 103 
 
  
Card, S. (2013). The effects of the activation of differentiated concepts of God on prosocial  
behavior. Master thesis, Utrecht University, Utrecht. 
Carelli, F. (2011). The book of death: Weighing your heart. London Journal of Primary Care,  
4(1), 86-87. doi: 10.1080/17571472.2011.11493336 
D’Souza, D. (2009). Life after death: The evidence. United States: Regnery Publishing Inc. 
Dawkins, R. (2007). The God delusion. London, United Kingdom: Transworld Publishers  
Ltd. 
DeBono, A., Shariff, A. F., Poole, S., & Muraven, M. (2017). Forgive us our trespasses:  
Priming a forgiving (but not a punishing) god increases unethical behavior. 
Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 9(Suppl. 1), S1-S10. doi: 10.1037/ 
rel0000105 
Duhaime, E. P. (2015). Is the call to prayer a call to cooperation? A field experiment on the  
impact of religious salience on prosocial behavior. Judgment and Decision Making, 
10(6), 593-596. Retrieved on the 21st of June 2017, from: http://journal.sjdm.org/15/ 
15623/jdm15623.html 
Engel, C. (2011). Dictator games: A meta study. Experimental Economics, 14(4), 583-610.  
doi: 10.1007/s10683-011-9283-7 
Galen, L. W. (2012). Does religious belief promote prosociality? A critical examination. 
 Psychological Bulletin, 138(5), 876-906. doi: 10.1037/a0028251 
Gervais, W. M., & Norenzayan, A. (2012). Like a camera in the sky? Thinking about God  
increases public self-awareness and socially desirable responding. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 298-302. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2011.09.006 
Gould, S. J. (1997). This view of life: Nonoverlapping magisteria. Natural History, 106(2),  
16-22. Retrieved on the 4th of March 2017, from: http://jbburnett.com/resources/ 
gould_nonoverlapping.pdf 
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 104 
 
  
Green, S. B., & Salkind, N. J. (2016). Using SPSS for Windows and Macintosh: Analyzing  
and understanding the data (8th ed.). United States: Pearson Education. 
Hadnes, M. & Schumacher, H. (2012). The gods are watching: An experimental study of  
religion and traditional belief in Burkina Faso. Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion, 51(4), 689-704. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5906.2012.01676.x 
Haley, K. J., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2005). Nobody's watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in  
an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26(3), 245-256. doi: 
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2005.01.002 
Hall, D. L., Matz, D. C., & Wood, W. (2010). Why don’t we practice what we preach? A  
meta-analytic review of religious racism. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 
14(1), 126-139. doi: 10.1177/1088868309352179 
Harrell, A. (2012). Do religious cognitions promote prosociality? Rationality and Society,  
24(4), 463-482. doi: 10.1177/1043463112463930 
Harris, S. (2006). The end of faith: Religion, terror, and the future of reason. London, United  
Kingdom: Simon & Schuster. 
Harris, S. (2011, April 7). The God debate II: Sam Harris vs. William Lane Craig,  
University of Notre Dame. Retrieved on the 10th of February 2017, from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqaHXKLRKzg 
Heineck, G. (2014). Love thy neighbor: Religion and prosocial behavior. BERG 
Working Paper Series 93. Bamberg: Bamberg University. 
Hills, A. M. (2011). Foolproof guide to statistics using IBM SPSS (2nd ed.). French’s Forest:  
Prentice Hall. 
Huber, S. (2003). Zentralität und inhalt: Ein neues multidimensionales messmodell der  
religiosität. United Kingdom: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
 
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 105 
 
  
Huber, S., & Huber, O. W. (2012). The centrality of religiosity scale (CRS). Religions, 3(4),  
710-724. doi: 10.3390/rel3030710 
Jacobs, C., & Sack, A. T. (2012). Behavior in oblivion: The neurobiology of subliminal  
priming. Brain Sciences, 2(4), 225-241. doi: 10.3390/brainsci2020225 
Johnson, D. (2016). God is watching you: How the fear of God makes us human. NY, United  
States: Oxford University Press. 
Johnson, D. D. P. (2005). God’s punishment and public goods: A test of the supernatural  
punishment hypothesis in 186 world cultures. Human Nature, 16(4), 410-446. doi: 
10.1007/s12110-005-1017-0 
Johnson, D. D. P., & Krüger, O. (2004). The good of wrath: Supernatural punishment and the  
evolution of cooperation. Political Theology, 5(2), 159-176. doi: 10.1558/poth.2004. 
5.2.159 
Johnson, D., & Bering, J. (2006). Hand of God, mind of man. Punishment and cognition in  
the evolution of cooperation. Evolutionary Psychology, 4, 219-233. doi: 10.1177/ 
147470490600400119 
Johnson, M. K., Rowatt, W. C., & LaBouff, J. (2010). Priming Christian religious concepts  
increases racial prejudice. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 1, 119-126. 
doi: 10.1177/1948550609357246 
Malarkey, A., & Malarkey, K. (2011). The boy who came back from heaven: A remarkable  
account of miracles, angels, and life beyond this world. Wheaton, IL, United States: 
Tyndale House Publishers. 
Malinowski, B. (1935). The foundations of faith and morals: An anthropological analysis of  
primitive beliefs and conduct with special reference to the fundamental problem of 
religion and ethics. London: Oxford University Press. 
 
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 106 
 
  
Molden, D. C. (2014). Understanding priming effects in social psychology: What is “social  
priming” and how does it occur?. Social Cognition, 32(SPEC. ISSUE), 1-11. doi: 
10.1521/soco.2014.32.supp.1 
Molyneux, S. B. (2016, April 30). Why I was right about atheism. Retrieved on the 5th of  
March 2017, from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-rD4gD3Oe4&t=3m41s 
Moustafa, A. A., Gilbertson, M. W., Orr, S. P., Herzallah, M. M., Servatius, R. J., & Myers,  
C. E. (2013). A model of amygdala-hippocampal-prefrontal interaction in fear 
conditioning and extinction in animals. Brain and Cognition, 81(1), 29-43. Doi: 
10.1016/j.bandc.2012.10.005 
Orsini, C. A., & Maren, S. (2012). Neural and cellular mechanisms of fear and extinction  
memory formation. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 36(7), 1773-1802. Doi: 
10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.12.014 
Petrisko, T. W. (2000). Inside Heaven and Hell: What history, theology and the mystics tell  
us about the afterlife. United States: Saint Andrew’s Productions. 
Pew Research Center. (2013). The world’s Muslims: Religion, politics and society. Retrieved  
on the 11th of May 2017, from: http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-
muslims-religion-politics-society-beliefs-about-sharia/ 
Piazza, J., & Bering, J. M. (2008). Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous  
allocations in an economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29(3), 172-178. 
doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002 
Pichon, I., Boccato, G., & Saroglou, V. (2007). Nonconscious influences of religion on  
prosociality: A priming study. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(5), 1032-
1045. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.416 
Piper, D., & Murphey, C. (2014). 90 minutes in Heaven: A true story of death and life. MI,  
United States: Baker Publishing Group. 
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 107 
 
  
Powell, K. L., Roberts, G., & Nettle, D. (2012). Eye images increase charitable donations:  
Evidence from an opportunistic field experiment in a supermarket. Ethology, 118(11), 
1096-1101. doi: 10.1111/eth.12011 
Preston, J. L., & Ritter, R. S. (2013). Different effects of religion and God on prosociality  
with the ingroup and outgroup. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39(11),  
1471-1483. doi: 10.1177/0146167213499937 
Raihani, N. J., Mace, R., & Lamba, S. (2013). The effect of $1, $5 and $10 stakes in an  
online dictator game. PLoS ONE, 8(8), e73131. doi:10.1371/ journal.pone.0073131 
Randolph-Seng, B., & Nielsen, M. E. (2007). Honesty: One effect of primed religious  
representations. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 17(4), 303-315. 
doi: 10.1080/10508610701572812 
Randolph-Seng, B., & Nielsen, M. E. (2008). Is God really watching you? A response to  
Shariff and Norenzayan (2007). The International Journal for the Psychology of 
Religion, 18(2), 119-122. doi: 10.1080/10508610701879373 
Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Haque, O. S., Kane, R. J., Nowak, M. A., & Coakley, S. (2014).  
Religious motivations for cooperation: An experimental investigation using explicit 
primes. Religion, Brain & Behavior, 4, 31-48. doi: 10.1080/2153599X.2013.775664 
Regnerus, M. D., Smith, C., & Sikkink, D. (1998). Who gives to the poor? The influence of  
religious tradition and political location on the personal generosity of Americans 
toward the poor. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37(3), 481-493. doi: 
10.2307/1388055 
Retief, F. P., & Cilliers, L. (2006). Burial customs, the afterlife and the pollution of death in  
Ancient Greece. Acta Theologica, 26(2), 44-61. doi: 10.4314/actat.v26i2.52560  
 
 
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 108 
 
  
Ritter, R. S., & Preston, J. L. (2013). Representations of religious words: Insights for  
religious priming research. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 52(3), 494-
507. doi: 10.1111/jssr.12042 
Saad, G. (2011). The consuming instinct: What juicy burgers, Ferraris, pornography and gift  
giving reveal about human nature. Amherst, US: Prometheus Books. 
Saleam, J., & Moustafa, A. A. (2016). The influence of divine rewards and punishments on  
religious prosociality. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1149. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016. 
01149 
Shariff, A. F. (2008). One species under God? Sorting through the pieces of religion and  
Cooperation. In J. Bulbulia, R. Sosis, R. Genet, E. Harris, K. Wyman, & C. Genet 
(Eds.), The Evolution of Religion: Studies, Theories & Critiques (pp. 111-117), Santa 
Margarita, CA: Collins Foundation Press. 
Shariff, A. F., & Aknin, L. B. (2014). The emotional toll of Hell: Cross-national and 
experimental evidence for the negative well-being effects of Hell beliefs. PLoS ONE, 
9(1), e85251. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085251 
Shariff, A. F., & Norenzayan, A. (2007). God is watching you: Priming God concepts  
increases prosocial behavior in an anonymous economic game. Psychological Science 
18(9), 803–809. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01983.x 
Shariff, A. F., & Norenzayan, A. (2011). Mean gods make good people: Different views of  
God predict cheating behaviour. The International Journal for the Psychology of 
Religion, 21(2), 85-96. doi: 10.1080/10508619.2011.556990 
Shariff, A. F., & Rhemtulla, M. (2012). Divergent effects of beliefs in Heaven and Hell on  
national crime rates. PLoS ONE, 7(6), e39048. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0039048 
 
 
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 109 
 
  
Shariff, A. F., Willard, A. K., Andersen, T., & Norenzayan, A. (2016). Religious priming: A  
meta-analysis with a focus on prosociality. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 20(1), 27-48. doi: 10.1177/1088868314568811 
Simons, D. J., & Chabris, C. F. (2012). Common (mis)beliefs about memory: A replication  
and comparison of telephone and Mechanical Turk survey methods. PLoS ONE, 
7(12), e51876. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0051876 
Sosis, R., & Ruffle, B. J. (2003). Religious ritual and cooperation: Testing for a relationship  
on Israeli religious and secular kibbutzim. Current Anthropology, 44(5), 713–722. 
doi: 10.1086/379260 
Srull, T. K., & Wyer, R. S. (1979). The role of category accessibility in the interpretation of  
information about persons: Some determinants and implications. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 37(10), 1660-1672. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.37.10.1660 
Stark, R. (2008). The complexities of comparative research. Interdisciplinary Journal of  
Research on Religion, 4, 2-15. Retrieved on the 10th of September 2017, from: 
http://www.religjournal.com/pdf/ijrr04004.pdf 
Stavrova, O., & Siegers, P. (2014). Religious prosociality and morality across cultures: How  
social enforcement of religion shapes the effects of personal religiosity on  prosocial 
and moral attitudes and behaviors. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(3), 
315-333. doi: 10.1177/0146167213510951 
Summerville, A., & Chartier, C. R. (2013). Pseudo-dyadic “interaction” on Amazon’s  
Mechanical Turk. Behavior Research Methods, 45(1), 116-124. doi: 10.3758/s13428-
012-0250-9 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using multivariate statistics (5th ed.). Boston,  
MA: Allyn & Bacon. 
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 110 
 
  
van Cappellen, P., Saroglou, V., & Toth-Gauthier, M. (2016). Religiosity and prosocial  
behavior among churchgoers: Exploring underlying mechanisms. The International 
Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 26(1), 19-30. doi: 10.1080/10508619.2014. 
958004 
van Elk, M., Matzke, D., Gronau, Q. F., Guan, M., Vandekerckhove, J., & Wagenmakers, E- 
J. (2016). Meta-analyses are no substitute for registered replications: A skeptical 
perspective on religious priming. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1365. doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01365 
von Hippel, W., Lakin, J. L., & Shakarchi, R. J. (2005). Individual differences in motivated  
social cognition: The case of self-serving information processing. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(10), 1347-1357. doi: 10.1177/0146167205274899 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief  
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063 
Yilmaz, O., & Bahçekapili, H. G. (2016). Supernatural and secular monitors promote human  
cooperation only if they remind of punishment. Evolution and Human Behavior, 
37(1), 79-84. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.09.005 
Zacharias, R. (2015). The bird still sings: Why Christianity cannot be silenced. Retrieved on  
the 10th of July, 2017, from: http://rzim.org/global-blog/the-bird-still-sings/ 
  
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 111 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
  
RELIGIOUS REWARD PRIMES & PROSOCIALITY 112 
 
  
Appendix A 
Human Ethics Approval Form 
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Appendix B 
Study Information for Studies 1 and 2 
Description 
***IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT YOU CAN 
READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. IF YOU ARE NOT FLUENT 
IN ENGLISH, PLEASE DO NOT CONTINUE.*** 
 
You are invited to participate in two research studies being conducted by James Saleam, a 
Masters’ student from the School of Social Sciences and Psychology at Western Sydney 
University. Both studies are being supervised by Dr. Ahmed Moustafa and Dr. Alan Nixon.  
 
Study 1 will explore how people rate different kinds of texts, and how peoples’ personal 
levels of religiosity, and their current moods, relate to the ratings they give. Study 2 explores 
how people divide money between themselves and anonymous strangers (Group 1), and 
explores whether people can accurately predict what percentage of money they just received 
(Group 2). 
 
How is the study being paid for? 
 
Both projects are supported by a grant from the School of Social Sciences and Psychology at 
Western Sydney University. 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
 
In Study 1, you will be asked to complete a short survey regarding certain basic details (e.g., 
age, sex, how religious you think you are, etc.). You will then read a short passage of text, 
and rate how ‘impressive’ and ‘meaningful’ you found that text to be. Following this, you 
will complete another short survey regarding your current mood. 
 
In Study 2, you have been assigned to Group 1. Group 1 participants are given a small sum of 
money to split between themselves and an anonymous participant from Group 2. Whatever 
amount you choose to keep will be awarded to you via MTurk at the end of the study. 
 
How much of my time will I need to give? 
 
Completing both studies will take you approximately 20 minutes. 
 
What benefits will I, and/or the broader community, receive for participating? 
 
Participants will be paid $1.37(AUD) for participating, and will also receive the amount of 
money they choose to keep in Study 2. 
 
Will these studies involve any risk or discomfort for me? If so, what will be done to 
address it? 
 
No discomfort is expected to result from participation in either study. However, if you are 
feeling distressed or uncomfortable at any time, you may cease participation. 
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How will the results be published or disseminated? 
 
The results of these research projects will be published within a Master’s thesis. Published 
data will be presented in such a way that the participant cannot be identified. 
 
Will the data and information that I have provided be disposed of? 
 
Only the researchers will have access to the data you provide. However, your data may be 
used in other related projects for an extended period of time. None of the data used for other 
projects will contain information relevant to your identity. 
 
Can I withdraw from the study? 
 
Participation is entirely voluntary, and you are not obliged to be involved. If you do 
participate you can withdraw at any time without giving reason. If you choose to withdraw, 
any information that you have supplied will be disposed of at your request. 
 
What if I require further information? 
 
Please contact James Saleam (e-mail: 17122492@student.westernsydney.edu.au), should you 
wish to discuss the research further before deciding whether or not to participate. 
 
What if I have a complaint? 
 
If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you 
may contact the Ethics Committee through Research Engagement, Development and 
Innovation (REDI) on Tel +61 2 4736 0229 or email humanethics@westernsydney.edu.au. 
 
Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be 
informed of the outcome. 
 
These studies have been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at Western 
Sydney University. The ethics reference number is: H12092. 
 
If you think these studies violate Amazon Mechanical Turk's terms and conditions, you can 
seek further information, or make a formal complaint by visiting: 
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/contactus 
 
Only people who are fluent in the English language are eligible to participate. Are you 
fluent in the English language? 
 
Yes / No 
 
Do you understand and acknowledge all of the information provided above? 
 
Yes / No 
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Appendix C 
 
Informed Consent Form for Studies 1 and 2 
 
By confirming my consent, I am acknowledging that:  
 
-The procedures and the time involved have been explained to me, and I have been given the 
opportunity to contact the researcher if I had any questions regarding these studies. 
 
By confirming my consent, I am prepared to: 
 
-Participate in an online reading and rating task 
 
-Complete online questionnaires regarding my mood and certain personal attributes (e.g., age, 
gender, religious devotion) 
 
-Participate in an economic game involving money 
 
By confirming my consent, I understand that: 
 
-My involvement is confidential, and that the information gained during the study may be 
published and stored for other research use but no information about me will be used in any 
way that reveals my identity 
 
-I can withdraw from the study at any time without affecting my relationship with the 
researcher/s, and any organisations involved, now or in the future 
 
Do you consent? 
 
Yes / No 
 
Please create an 8-character password. Make it as unique as you can, so that you can be 
identified and paid on Murk. 
 
 
__________________________ 
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Appendix D 
Demographics questionnaire 
Study 1 
Please respond to all questions. 
What is your gender? Male / Female 
 
 
What is your age? 
 
 
What is your religion (if any)? 
 
 
How religious do you consider yourself to be (1 = not at all; 7 = very devout)? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
For how many years have you studied at a university or college? 
 
None; Less than 1 year; 1 year; 2 years; 3 years; 4 or more years 
 
 
In what country do you live? 
 
 
How wealthy do you consider yourself to be (1 = very poor; 7 = very rich)? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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Appendix E 
Shortened PANAS for Studies 1 and 2 
Mood Survey 
 
Consider each word in the left-most column and think about how well that word 
describes your current mood. Provide a response for each word. 
 
How accurately does each of the following words reflect your current mood? (1 star = not at 
all; 5 stars = highly accurately) 
 
 
Active 
 
     
Afraid 
 
     
Angry (at self) 
 
     
Ashamed 
 
     
Attentive 
 
     
Calm 
 
     
Cheerful 
 
     
Delighted 
 
     
Depressed 
 
     
Disgusted (at self) 
 
     
Distressed 
 
     
Enthusiastic 
 
     
Guilty 
 
     
Happy 
 
     
Irritable 
 
     
Joyful 
 
     
Loathing 
 
     
Proud 
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Relaxed 
 
     
Sad 
 
     
 
Briefly, how would you describe your current mood? 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you think the point of this research is? 
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Appendix F 
Dictator Game 
Study 2 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. 
 
You are about to play an economic game. You have been assigned to Group 1 (the 'Sender' 
group). 
 
You will be given $1.00(AUD), which you can split between yourself and an anonymous 
participant from the 'Receiver' group. Receiver group participants are completing a different 
task, not involving payments. You can split the money however you like (e.g., you can keep 
$0.50 and send $0.50, or you can keep $0.25 and send $0.75, and so on). And how much you 
decide to keep will not affect your $1.37(AUD) participation payment. You will receive 
whatever you decide to keep in addition to the $1.37(AUD) you get for participating. 
 
Please note, the Receiver participants will be given no information about you or how much 
money you decided to keep. They will not even know that the initial amount given to you was 
$1.00(AUD). Hence, there is no pressure on you to give anything; how much you send is 
entirely up to you. 
 
How much of the $1.00(AUD) would you like to send to the person from the Receiver 
group? Do not include a dollar sign ($); simply nominate how much money you would like to 
send (e.g., 0.25, 0.50 or 0.95). 
 
 
 
 
Please ensure that the amount you have decided to send is an amount between 0.00 and 
1.00. If you enter an invalid amount, your data for this study will not be valid. 
 
 
What do you think the point of this research is? 
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Appendix G 
Debriefing E-Mail for Studies 1 and 2 
Dear participant, 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. This e-mail has been sent to inform you about the study you 
participated in and provide you with avenues to provide feedback or express any concerns you may 
have. 
 
During this study, you were told that you were actually participating in two separate studies; the first 
involving a couple of surveys and the rating of a passage of text, and the second involving an 
economic game where you are given the chance to split a sum of money between yourself and a 
second (anonymous) participant from another group. In actual fact, these were simply two elements of 
the same study. 
 
The purpose of this study was to assess how the reading of different kinds of texts influences 
generosity. Some participants read a religious text about how God rewards moral behaviour, some 
read a text about God’s positive attributes, and others read a text about language. It was expected that 
reading a text about how God rewards good people would result in readers giving more money to the 
anonymous participant in the economic game. These details were not disclosed at the beginning, as 
knowledge of the study’s aims may have affected the results. There were no malicious intentions 
behind the withholding of this information. 
 
If you have any concerns about the study, the purpose(s) of the research, or any other queries, please 
see the information below. 
 
Information and Contact Details 
 
How was this study funded? 
This project is supported by a grant from the School of Social Sciences and Psychology at Western 
Sydney University. 
 
How do you intend to publish or disseminate the results? 
It is anticipated that the results of this research project will be published within a master’s thesis. 
Published data will be presented in such a way that the participant cannot be identified. 
 
Will the data and information that I have provided be disposed of? 
Please be assured that only the researchers will have access to the raw data you provide. However, 
your data may be used in other related projects for an extended period of time. No personal details 
will be kept with the data, to ensure confidentiality. 
 
Can I withdraw from the study? 
If you would like to withdraw your data from the study, please inform James Saleam (e-mail: 
17122492@student.westernsydney.edu.au). Withdrawing your data will result in a forfeiture of any 
money earned for participation and during the study (i.e., during the economic game). 
 
Can I tell other people about the study?  
You can tell others about the study, but it is important that the purpose of the study not be disclosed to 
anyone who may participate in the study, as this could affect their responses. 
 
What if I require further information? 
Please contact James Saleam if you have any enquiries regarding the study you participated in 
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E-mail: 17122492@student.westernsydney.edu.au 
 
What if I have a complaint? 
If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may contact 
the Ethics Committee through Research Engagement, Development and Innovation (REDI) on Tel 
+61 2 4736 0229 or email humanethics@westernsydney.edu.au. 
Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be informed of 
the outcome. 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you may be asked to sign the Participant Consent Form. The 
information sheet is for you to keep and the consent form is retained by the researcher/s.  
This study has been approved by the Western Sydney University Human Research Ethics Committee. 
The Approval number is H12092. 
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Appendix H 
Study Information and Informed Consent Form for Study 3 
Description 
***IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT YOU CAN 
READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. IF YOU ARE NOT FLUENT 
IN ENGLISH, PLEASE DO NOT CONTINUE.*** 
 
You are invited to participate in two research studies being conducted by James Saleam, a 
Masters student from the School of Social Sciences and Psychology at Western Sydney 
University. Both studies are being supervised by Dr. Ahmed Moustafa.  
 
Study 1 will explore how religious self-assessments influence mood and task performance. 
Study 2 explores how people divide money between themselves and charities in online 
settings. 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
 
In Study 1, you will be asked to complete a short survey regarding your religious beliefs, and 
some other basic details (e.g., age). You will then complete a short cognitive task involving 
the construction of coherent sentences. Following this, you will complete a short survey 
regarding your current mood. 
 
In Study 2, you will be given a small sum of money to split between yourself and an 
anonymous charity chosen by the researchers. Whatever amount you choose to keep will be 
awarded to you via MTurk at the end of the study. 
 
How will the results be published or disseminated? 
 
The results of these research projects will be published within a Master’s thesis. Published 
data will be presented in such a way that the participant cannot be identified. 
 
Will the data and information that I have provided be disposed of? 
 
Only the researchers will have access to the data you provide. However, your data may be 
used in other related projects for an extended period of time. None of the data used for other 
projects will contain information relevant to your identity. 
 
Can I withdraw from the study? 
 
Participation is entirely voluntary and you are not obliged to be involved. If you do 
participate you can withdraw at any time without giving reason. If you choose to withdraw, 
any information that you have supplied will be disposed of at your request. 
 
What if I require further information? 
 
Please contact James Saleam (e-mail: 17122492@student.westernsydney.edu.au), should you 
wish to discuss the research further before deciding whether or not to participate. 
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What if I have a complaint? 
 
If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you 
may contact the Ethics Committee through Research Engagement, Development and 
Innovation (REDI) on Tel +61 2 4736 0229 or email humanethics@westernsydney.edu.au. 
 
Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be 
informed of the outcome. 
 
These studies have been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at Western 
Sydney University. The ethics reference number is: H12092. 
 
If you think these studies violate Amazon Mechanical Turk's terms and conditions, you can 
seek further information, or make a formal complaint by visiting: 
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/contactus 
 
Only people who are fluent in the English language are eligible to participate. Are you 
fluent in the English language? 
 
Yes / No 
 
Do you understand and acknowledge all of the information provided above? 
 
Yes / No 
 
Do you consent to participating in both studies? 
 
Yes / No 
 
Please create a password of at least 8 characters. Make it as unique as you can, so that 
you can be identified and paid on MTurk. You can use your MTurk Worker ID if you 
want to. 
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Appendix I 
Centrality of Religiosity Scale: Version 10 (Amended) 
*The numbers in parentheses indicate how many points a particular response contributes 
towards a participant’s overall CRS score. These values were not visible to participants, and 
are displayed here only to demonstrate how participants’ responses were scored.* 
 
Study 1 
 
Please respond to all questions. 
 
What is your gender? Male / Female 
 
 
What is your age? 
 
 
In what country do you live? 
 
 
For how many years have you studied at a university or college? 
 
None; Less than 1 year; 1 year; 2 years; 3 years; 4 or more years 
 
 
How wealthy do you consider yourself to be (1 = very poor; 7 = very rich)? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
What is your religion (if any)? 
 
 
For the following questions, please consider your personal conception of "God" or 
"something divine". 
 
 Not at all 
(1) 
Not much 
(2) 
Moderately 
(3) 
Quite a 
bit (4) 
Very much 
(5) 
1. To what extent do you believe 
that God, or something divine, 
exists? 
     
2. How interested are you in 
learning more about religious 
topics? 
     
3. To what extent do you believe 
in an afterlife (e.g., immortality 
of the soul, resurrection of the 
dead, or reincarnation)? 
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4. How important is it to take 
part in religious services? 
     
5. How important is personal 
prayer to you? 
     
 
How often do you pray? 
 
Several times per day (5) 
 
Once per day (5) 
 
More than once per week (4) 
 
Once per week (3) 
 
One to three times per month (3) 
 
A few times per year (2) 
 
Once per year or less (2) 
 
Never (1) 
 
 
How often do you take part in religious services? 
 
More than once per week (5) 
 
Once per week (5) 
 
One to three times per month (4) 
 
A few times per year (3) 
 
Once per year or less (2) 
 
Never (1) 
 
 
Please carefully consider your answers to the following questions. 
 
 Not at all 
(1) 
Not much 
(2) 
Moderately 
(3) 
Quite a 
bit (4) 
Very much 
(5) 
1. How often do you think about 
religious issues? 
     
2. How often do you experience 
situations in which you have the 
feeling that God or something 
divine intervenes in your life? 
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3. How often do you experience 
situations in which you have the 
feeling that God or something 
divine wants to show or reveal 
something to you? 
     
 
 
Briefly, how would you describe your religious beliefs? 
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Appendix J 
Sentence Unscrambling Task 
Sentence Construction Task 
 
In this task, you will be presented with a series of word-lists. You will be asked to create 
coherent 4-word sentences from the word-lists provided. However, each word-list 
actually contains 5 words. One of the 5 words is out of place, and will need to be 
removed so that a coherent sentence can be formed. 
 
The words in each list will appear in a random order, so after you remove the word that 
does not seem to fit, you must then rearrange the remaining 4 words to form a coherent 
sentence. 
 
Consider the following examples... 
 
Was; It; Cavern; There; Up 
 
The word 'cavern' does not seem to fit. If this word is removed, the following sentence can be 
formed: It was up there. 
------- 
 
Door; Through; Go; Until; The 
 
The word 'until' does not seem to fit. If this word is removed, the following sentence can be 
formed: Go through the door. 
------- 
 
The task begins on the next page, so move on when you fully understand the rules of the task. 
 
NOTE: In order to be paid for this task, please check your responses to ensure that they make 
sense. If more than two of your responses are incorrect, it will be assumed that you did not 
seriously attempt the task, and your response will be deemed invalid. 
 
Enter each 4-word sentence in the box below each word-list. 
 
[Religious Reward condition] 
 
There; Chance; Forthwith; No; Is 
 
Grants; God; Life; Eternal; Five 
 
Is; Wonderful; Heaven; Beetle; Very 
 
Train; Salvation; Us; Awaits; Eternal 
 
Let’s; Dreamed; Inside; All; Wait 
 
That; Was; Miracle; Walked; A 
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Saved; I; Been; Have; Find 
 
Sticks; Tap; There; Two; Were 
 
People; Nice; Goodwill; Afterlife; Have 
 
Go; Time; Why; It’s; To 
 
Don’t; Heaven; Please; Do; That 
 
Wanted; Salvation; Regarding; Just; He 
 
 
Many of the sentences above contained religious content. Which of the following words 
best describes the underlying religious theme in those sentences? 
 
God’s anger 
God’s apathy 
God’s leniency 
God’s mercifulness 
God’s punishments 
God’s rewards 
God’s vengefulness 
 
 
[Religious Neutral condition] 
 
There; Chance; Forthwith; No; Is 
 
Is; Prayer; Older; Important; Very 
 
Is; Codes; Faith; Important; Religious 
 
Always; God; Doors; There; Is 
 
Let’s; Dreamed; Inside; All; Wait 
 
Church; Quiet; Was; The; Habits 
 
Twice; He; Temple; Visited; The 
 
Sticks; Tap; There; Two; Were 
 
People; Nice; Goodwill; Spiritual; Have 
 
Go; Time; Why; It’s; To 
 
Don’t; God; Please; Do; That 
 
Important; Is; Hopeful; Faith; Highly 
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In your opinion, which of the following words best describes the nature of God? 
 
Angry 
Apathetic 
Lenient 
Merciful 
Punishing 
Rewarding 
Vengeful 
 
 
[Secular Reward condition] 
 
There; Chance; Forthwith; No; Is 
 
Good; Awards; People; Receive; Triplet 
 
Work; His; Appreciated; Towers; Was 
 
Kindness; Rewarded; Her; Makings; Was 
 
Let’s; Dreamed; Inside; All; Wait 
 
Round; A; Applause; Circuit; Of 
 
Awards; I’ve; Many; Have; Received 
 
Sticks; Tap; There; Two; Were 
 
People; Nice; Goodwill; Bounty; Have 
 
Go; Time; Why; It’s; To 
 
Don’t; Rewarded; Please; Do; That 
 
Generosity; Fame; With; Elegant; Comes 
 
 
Many of the sentences above contained social content. Which of the following words 
best describes the underlying theme in those sentences? 
 
Society’s anger 
Society’s apathy 
Society’s leniency 
Society’s mercifulness 
Society’s punishments 
Society’s rewards 
Society’s vengefulness 
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[Secular Neutral condition] 
 
There; Chance; Forthwith; No; Is 
 
Article; Long; Tutor; The; Was 
 
Always; Are; People; Door; There 
 
Was; House; The; Habits; Quiet 
 
Let’s; Dreamed; Inside; All; Wait 
 
Is; Digit; Library; The; Empty 
 
Recognized; I; Man; Have; The 
 
Sticks; Tap; There; Two; Were 
 
Owns; Jury; She; Properties; Many 
 
Go; Time; Library; It’s; To 
 
Don’t; Throwing; Please; Do; That 
 
There; People; With; Ten; Were 
 
 
In your opinion, which of the following words best describes the nature of society? 
 
Angry 
Apathetic 
Lenient 
Merciful 
Punishing 
Rewarding 
Vengeful 
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Appendix K 
Shortened PANAS for Study 3 
Mood Survey 
 
Consider each word in the left-most column, and think about how well that word 
describes your current mood. Provide a response for each word. 
 
How accurately does each of the following words reflect your current mood? (1 star = not at 
all; 5 stars = highly accurately) 
 
 
Angry (at self) 
 
     
Attentive 
 
     
Calm 
 
     
Depressed 
 
     
Enthusiastic 
 
     
Guilty 
 
     
Happy 
 
     
Irritable 
 
     
Proud 
 
     
Sad 
 
     
 
Briefly, how would you describe your current mood? 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you think the point of this research is? 
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Appendix L 
Charity Task 
Study 2 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. 
 
For this task, you will be given $1.00(AUD), which you can split between yourself and a 
charity organisation for the homeless (the specific charity will be chosen by the researcher). 
You can split the money however you like (e.g., you can keep $0.50 and send $0.50 to 
charity, or you can keep $0.25 and send $0.75 to charity, and so on). And how much you 
decide to keep will not affect your participation payment. You will receive whatever you 
decide to keep in addition to the $0.64(AUD) you get for participating. 
 
There is no pressure on you to donate any particular amount; how much you donate is 
entirely up to you. 
 
How much of the $1.00(AUD) would you like to donate to charity? Do not include a dollar 
sign ($); simply nominate how much money you would like to donate (e.g., 0.25, 0.50 or 
0.95). What is left over will be yours to keep. 
 
 
 
 
Please ensure that the amount you have decided to donate is an amount between 0.00 
and 1.00. If you enter an invalid amount, your data for this study will not be valid. 
 
 
What do you think the point of this research is? 
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Appendix M 
Debriefing E-Mail for Study 3 
Dear participant, 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. This e-mail has been sent to inform you about the study you 
participated in, and provide you with avenues to provide feedback or express any concerns you may 
have. 
 
During this study, you were told that you were actually participating in two separate studies; the first 
involving a sentence unscrambling task, and the second involving a charitable giving scenario where 
you are given the chance to split a sum of money between yourself and an unspecified charity chosen 
by me. In actual fact, these were simply two elements of the same study. 
 
The purpose of this study was to assess whether exposure to particular concepts/words in the sentence 
unscrambling task would influence generosity in the charity task. Some participants unscrambled 
sentences about God’s rewards for moral behaviour, some unscrambled sentences containing general 
religious terms (e.g., ‘church’), some unscrambled sentences about society’s rewards for moral 
behaviours, and others unscrambled sentences with no real theme. 
 
It was expected that those who were reminded of God’s and/or society’s rewards for good people 
would donate more money to charity than participants in the other groups. These details were not 
disclosed at the beginning, as knowledge of the study’s aims may have affected the results. There 
were no malicious intentions behind the withholding of this information. 
 
If you have any concerns about the study, the purpose(s) of the research, or any other queries, please 
see the information below. 
 
Information and Contact Details 
 
How was this study funded? 
This project is supported by a grant from the School of Social Sciences and Psychology at Western 
Sydney University. 
 
How do you intend to publish or disseminate the results? 
It is anticipated that the results of this research project will be published within a Master’s thesis. 
Published data will be presented in such a way that the participant cannot be identified. 
 
Will the data and information that I have provided be disposed of? 
Please be assured that only the researchers will have access to the raw data you provide. However, 
your data may be used in other related projects for an extended period of time. No personal details 
will be kept with the data, to ensure confidentiality. 
 
Can I withdraw from the study? 
If you would like to withdraw your data from the study, please inform James Saleam (e-mail: 
17122492@student.westernsydney.edu.au). Withdrawing your data will result in a forfeiture of any 
money earned for participation and during the study (i.e., during the economic game). 
 
Can I tell other people about the study?  
You can tell others about the study, but it is important that the purpose of the study not be disclosed to 
anyone who may participate in the study, as this could affect their responses. 
 
What if I require further information? 
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Please contact James Saleam if you have any enquiries regarding the study you participated in 
 
E-mail: 17122492@student.westernsydney.edu.au 
 
What if I have a complaint? 
If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may contact 
the Ethics Committee through Research Engagement, Development and Innovation (REDI) on Tel 
+61 2 4736 0229 or email humanethics@westernsydney.edu.au. 
Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be informed of 
the outcome. 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you may be asked to sign the Participant Consent Form. The 
information sheet is for you to keep and the consent form is retained by the researcher/s.  
This study has been approved by the Western Sydney University Human Research Ethics Committee. 
The Approval number is H12092. 
